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LEGAL/ACCOUNTING REGULATORY AGENCIES
the Board's agents (e.g., its investigators and AC members)
should not be attributed to the Board acting in its capacity as
a quasi-judicial body.
During the pendency of this judicial proceeding, the ad-
ministrative hearing on CBA's accusation against KPMG com-
menced on March 15, 2000 before Administrative Law Judge
Humberto Flores, and concluded on December 29, 2000. On
behalf of the Board, the Attorney General's Office submitted
its closing briefs on February 15,2001, and-at this writing-
KPMG is scheduled to submit its closing briefs on May 7,2001.
RECENT MEETINGS
At its November 19, 1999 meeting, CBA elected public
member Baxter Rice as president, CPA Donna McCluskey as
vice-president, and CPA Michael Schneider as secretary-trea-
surer for 2000.
At its November 2000 meeting, CBA elected Donna
McCluskey as president and public member Navid Sharafatian
as vice-president, and reelected Michael Schneider as secre-
tary-treasurer for 2001.
FUTURE MEETINGS
2001: May 18 in Sacramento; July 20 in San Francisco;
September 21 in Los Angeles; November 16 in San Diego.
2002: January 24-25 in San Francisco; March 22-23 in
Los Angeles; May 16-17 in San Diego; July 19 in San Fran-
cisco; September 20 in Sacramento; November 14-15 in San
Diego.
2003: January 23-24 in Redwood City; March 21-22 in
Santa Monica; May 15-16 in San Diego; July 25 in San Fran-
cisco; September 19 in Los Angeles; November 14 in Sacra-
mento.
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he State Bar of California was created by legislative
act in 1927 and codified in the California Constitution
at Article VI, section 9. The State Bar was established
as a public corporation within the judicial branch of govern-
ment, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys prac-
ticing law in California. More than 175,000 lawyers are mem-
bers of the State Bar.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of
functions that fall into six major categories: (1) testing State
Bar applicants, accrediting law schools, and promoting com-
petence-based education; (2) enforcing the State Bar Act,
Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) ensuring the deliv-
ery of and access to legal services; (4) educating the public;
(5) improving the administration of justice; and (6) provid-
ing member services.
The State Bar maintains approximately 40 standing and
special committees including over 200 appointees and ad-
dressing numerous issues. Sixteen subject-matter "sections"
focus on specialized substantive areas of law-ranging from
antitrust law to workers' compensation to criminal law. These
sections, which are operated by volunteer committees, pub-
lish information about their respective subject areas and as-
sist the Bar in administering its Minimum Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) program, which requires most Bar mem-
bers to complete 25 hours of MCLE every three years. The
Bar also operates the Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to local, ethnic, and specialty bar asso-
ciations statewide. Effective January 1, 2000, the Bar is pro-
hibited from funding its sections and the Conference of Del-
egates with members' compulsory Bar licensing fees (see
MAJOR PROJECTS).
The Bar grants "specialty certi-
fication" status to over 3,600 attor-
neys who practice in one of eight
fields: appellate; criminal; estate planning, trust, and probate;
family; immigration and nationality; personal and small busi-
ness bankruptcy; taxation; and workers' compensation. In gen-
eral, attorneys may practice in these fields without certifica-
tion, but meeting the Bar's substantive standards allow them
to advertise their "specialty certification" status.
The Bar also operates several service programs, including
its Legal Services Trust Fund Program. Established by the leg-
islature in the early 1980s, this program is funded by interest-
bearing demand trust accounts held by attorneys for their cli-
ents; through a grant process, these funds are distributed to
legal services programs serving the poor statewide. The Legal
Services Trust Fund Program also distributes the Equal Access
Fund, a $10 million annual state fund for improving the ad-
ministration of justice for low-income Californians.
The Bar is funded primarily by fees paid by attorneys
and applicants to practice law. Over two-thirds of the Bar's
annual budget is spent on its attorney discipline system, which
includes a toll-free complaint hotline and in-house profes-
sional investigators and prosecutors housed in the Office of
the Chief Trial Counsel. The California Bar's attorney disci-
pline system also includes the nation's first full-time profes-
sional attorney discipline court which neither consists of nor
is controlled by practicing lawyers. The State Bar Court con-
sists of the Hearing Department (which includes five full-
time judges who preside over individual disciplinary hear-
ings) and a three-member Review Department which reviews
appeals from hearing judge decisions. The State Bar Court
recommends discipline to the California Supreme Court,
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which-prior to major reforms in the early 1990s- would con-
sider each case and issue a written decision. Under the new
system and "finality rules" adopted by the Supreme Court in
1991, State Bar Court decisions must be appealed to the Su-
preme Court, and its review is discretionary (see LMGATION).
The Bar may impose a wide range of potential sanctions against
violators of the State Bar Act or the Rules of Professional Con-
duct; penalties can range from private reproval to disbarment,
and may include "involuntary inactive enrollment" (interim
suspension) under Business and Professions Code s ction 6007.
In connection with its discipline system, the Bar operates two
client assistance programs: its Client Security Fund, which at-
tempts to compensate clients who are victims of attorney theft;
and its Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program, which arbitrates
fee disputes between attorneys and their clients in an informal,
out-of-court setting.
The State Bar Act designates a Board of Governors to
run the Bar. The Board President is elected by the Board of
Governors and serves a one-year term beginning in Septem-
ber. Only governors who have served on the Board for three
years are eligible to run for President.
The Board of Governors consists of 23 members: six-
teen licensed attorneys, six non-lawyer public members, and
the Board President. Fifteen of the sixteen attorney members
are elected to the Board by lawyers in nine geographic dis-
tricts; the sixteenth attorney member is a representative of
the California Young Lawyers Association (CYLA), appointed
by that organization's Board of Directors each year for a one-
year term. The Governor is authorized to appoint four of the
six public members; the Assembly Speaker and Senate Rules
Committee each appoint one public member. Each Board
member serves a three-year term, except for the CYLA rep-
resentative (who serves for one year) and the Board Presi-
dent (who serves a fourth year when elected to the presidency).
Members' terms are staggered to provide for the election of
five attorneys and the appointment of two public members
each year.
In December 1999, Senate President pro Tempore John
Burton appointed a new public member, Democratic activist
and retired investor Manning J. Post, to the Board of Gover-
nors. Unfortunately, Post's term ended early with his death
on March 13, 2000. Senator Burton appointed retired actress
Julie Sommars to fill the vacancy. Sommars previously served
on the Commission on Judicial Performance.
In June 2000, Palmer Brown Madden was elected as 75th
president of the State Bar and was sworn in at the Bar's an-
nual meeting in San Diego in September 2000. Madden re-
cently opened a mediation service in Alamo after fourteen
years as a partner with McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
in Walnut Creek.
On August 31,2000, five attorneys were elected to serve
three-year terms on the Board of Governors: Robert Keith
Persons (District 1) has a general civil practice in Butte
County; Erica R. Yew (District 3) is a partner with McManis
Faulkner & Morgan specializing in intellectual law and per-
sonal injury; Anthony P. Capozzi (District 5) is a sole practi-
tioner working primarily as a federal trial attorney; Nancy J.
Hoffmeier Zamora (District 7) practices primarily in bank-
ruptcy law and business litigation; and Judith M. Copeland
(District 9) is a probate specialist and partner at Copeland &
Tiernan.
The Board of Governors elected Karen S. Nobumoto as
State Bar President at a special meeting on March 13, 2001.
A Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney, Nobumoto
is the first government lawyer and the first minority woman
to serve as State Bar President. Elected from a field of five
candidates, Nobumoto will officially take office in Septem-
ber 2001. The early election is a new approach by the Board
of Governors, which agreed that a six-month period to pre-
pare to serve as President would be beneficial for the most
efficient functioning of the Board.
On March 20,2001, after two years of inactivity, Gover-
nor Gray Davis appointed two public members to the State
Bar Board of Governors. Janet M. Green of Riverside is a
registered nurse and the Director of Health Services at San
Bernardino Valley College. Green has represented the public
in law-related matters as a member of the California Judicial
Council's Jury Instruction Task Force and a member of the
San Bernardino County Youth Justice Center Community
Action Council. Dr. John G. Snetsinger is a professor of his-
tory and Director of International Education and Programs at
California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo. He
served on the legislative committee of the California Faculty
Association. At this writing, two Governor-appointed public
member slots remain vacant.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Bar Hires Executive Director
In April 2000 after a nationwide search, the Board of
Governors selected Judy Johnson, the Bar's Chief Trial Coun-
sel since 1994, as the Bar's new executive director. Johnson,
the first woman and first African-American appointed to the
job, oversees the day-to-day activities of the $80 million or-
ganization. Johnson replaces Steve Nissen, who left the of-
fice in March 1999. [17:1 CRLR 205] Johnson graduated from
Stanford University in 1971 and received her law degree from
the University of California at Davis' King Hall School of
Law in 1976. She worked briefly for the Legal Aid Society of
Alameda until 1977, when she became a deputy district at-
torney in San Francisco, specializing in consumer and major
fraud cases. She left that office in 1994 to become the Bar's
chief prosecutor. Johnson served on the Bar's Judicial Nomi-
nees Evaluation Commission from 1982-85, and was a mem-
ber of the Board of Governors from 1990-93.
Bar Resumes Collecting Dues, Implements SB 144
In 1999, Governor Davis signed SB 144 (Schiff and
Hertzberg) (Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999), which once again
authorizes the Bar to collect mandatory licensing fees from
its members to support most of its traditional activities; SB
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144 is the Bar's first regular dues authorization since 1996.
Unhappy with many activities of the Bar, former Governor
Pete Wilson vetoed the Bar's dues bill in 1997, causing the
Bar to essentially shut down in 1998. Along with authoriza-
tion to collect licensing fees, SB 144 also imposes restric-
tions on the use of those fees and on the Bar's legislative
activities, amends the provisions of its continuing education
program, and enacts other reforms aimed at perceived prob-
lems with the Bar's previous operations. Thus, thanks to SB
144, the Bar regained its funding source, but is struggling to
implement new limitations on how its funds may be used and
the scope of permissible activities.
SB 144 restricts total licensing fees to $395 annually
(compared to $478 in 1996 and $458 in 1997) and requires
the Bar to discount its fees for attorneys earning less than
$40,000 per year. SB 144 prohib-
its the Bar from using mandatory SB 144 restricts total lic
licensing fees to support two pro- (compared to $478 in I
grams that have proven controver-
sial-its Conference of Delegates requires the Bar to dis
(which gives a voice to local bar earning less than $40,00(
associations) and its subject-mat-
ter "sections." The bill authorizes the Bar to collect volun-
tary donations for the Conference and the sections, but es-
sentially requires these entities to become self-supporting.
SB 144 also addresses the issue of Bar lobbying on sub-
jects unrelated to its regulatory
functions. In Keller v. State Bar, The Board must first agi
496 U.S. 1 (1990), a unanimous thatthe legislative propos
U.S. Supreme Court struck down with Keller, in that it is re
as violative of the first amend- legal profession or imp
ment the Bar's use of mandatory services. The Board m
membership fees for ideological position taken on the leg
or political purposes unrelated to
the "regulation of the legal pro-
fession or improving the quality of legal services." The Court
also required the Bar to adopt adequate procedures, such as
those outlined in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292 (1986), to protect the interests of objectors by of-
fering them a way to "opt out" of paying for Keller-viola-
tive lobbying activities. In response to Keller, the Bar
adopted procedures under which it analyzes and categorizes
its expenses as "chargeable" or "nonchargeable," and of-
fers all Bar members an opportunity to decline to pay for
the nonchargeable portion (the so-called "Hudson deduc-
tion"). The Bar's calculation of minimal Hudson deduction
amounts in the late 1980s resulted in the decade-long
Brosterhous lawsuit (see LITIGATION). SB 144 attempts
to avoid future disputes by imposing a $5 Hudson deduc-
tion and by establishing a formula that restricts the amount
of Keller-violative lobbying in which the Bar may engage;
the bill precludes the Bar from spending a sum on non-Keller
lobbying that exceeds the $5 deduction multiplied by the
number of attorneys paying their dues who do not request
the deduction.
Further, SB 144 requires the Bar to undergo external and
independent financial audits. It requires the Bar to contract with
a nationally recognized public accounting firm to conduct an
audit of the Bar's financial statements for each fiscal year after
December 31, 1998. It also requires the Bureau of State Audits
(BSA) to conduct a performance audit of the Bar's operations
from July 1, 2000, through December 1, 2000 (see below).
Beginning in 2002, the Bar must contract with BSA to conduct
a performance audit every two years of its operations for that
fiscal year. These audits must be submitted to the Board of
Governors, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the Assembly. [17:1
CRLR 203-05; 16:2 CRLR 168-70; 16:1 CRLR 190-94]
The Bar has taken numerous actions to implement the
various provisions and limitations of SB 144, as follows:
* Lobbying Limitations. At
ing fees to $395 annually its December 1999 meeting, theBoard of Governors adopted a
and $458 in 1997) and resolution to implement proce-
nt its fees for attorneys dures designed to respond to chal-
}r year. lenges to the Bar's use of its funds
to support lobbying activities. The
new procedures require the Board to pass two separate mo-
tions, both by supermajority vote, before taking a position on
legislation. Under the new procedures, the Board must first
agree, by a two-thirds majority, that the legislative proposal
being considered complies with
by a two-thirds majority, Keller, in that it is related to the
yeing considered complies regulation of the legal profession
din onseredlatin coie or improving the quality of legal
ed to the regulation of the services. The Board must then also
ing the quality of legal approve any position taken on the
then also approve any legislation by a two-thirds vote.
tion by a two-thirds vote. The Board reaffirmed this policy
at IS tpIll 1 , 2UU0 meeting.
Also at its December 1999 meeting, the Board voted in
principle to require the Conference of Delegates and Bar sec-
tions to indicate clearly on any legislative position statement
that the position taken is not that of the State Bar, and that
Conference and section legislative activity is paid for entirely
with voluntary donations. The Board approved the exact lan-
guage of the required notice on February 5, 2000 and reaf-
firmed the policy at its April 1, 2000 meeting.
Also in December 1999, the Board voted to publish no-
tice of any legislative position taken by the Board in the Cali-
fornia Bar Journal immediately following the meeting at
which the position is taken. At its April 1, 2000 meeting, the
Board voted to apply these requirements to legislative posi-
tions taken by all Bar entities. After circulating this action for
public comment and receiving no comments, the Board reaf-
firmed the procedures at its August 2000 meeting.
* Expenditure Limitations. At its December 1999 meet-
ing, the Board of Governors voted to suspend then-existing
provisions of article IA of its rules and regulations regarding
chargeable and nonchargeable amounts and annual fees on












an interim basis. The Board approved a description of its ac-
tivities and legislative program for 2000, together with the
chargeability determinations made by the Bar regarding these
activities and programs, and directed staff to publish the de-
scription in the January 2000 issue of the California Bar Jour-
nal. The Board then adopted interim procedures regarding
annual membership fees, chargeable and nonchargeable
amounts, reductions, and appeals. The interim rule sets forth
procedures for determining chargeable and nonchargeable
amounts, provides members with notice of the chargeability
determinations of the Bar, and gives members an opportunity
to object. The Board authorized staff to circulate the interim
procedures for a 90-day public comment period. Having re-
ceived no comments, the Board approved these procedures
at its April 1, 2000 meeting.
On February 5, 2000, the Board approved the distribu-
tion of an informational document outlining the tests for
chargeability under the Keller and Brosterhous decisions (see
LITIGATION) and summarizing Bar activities permitted and
prohibited under the Brosterhous analysis. The Board also
decided, pending clarification or appellate review of that de-
cision, that no matter falling outside the parameters of
Brosterhous will be placed on the agenda of any Bar commit-
tee or commission unless the matter or its consideration in-
volves no expenditure of mandatory dues.
* Fee Scaling. At its December 1999 meeting, the Board
of Governors approved a change to article 1, section 7.1 of
the rules and regulations of the State Bar to provide for a
scaling option for Bar dues for members earning less than
$40,000 per year or less than $25,000 per year from the prac-
tice of law, as required by SB 144. Under the amended rule,
Bar members who believe they are eligible for fee scaling
must provide documentation of income to the Bar by Febru-
ary 1 of the year in which the fee is payable. Attorneys earn-
ing less than $40,000 qualify for a 25% fee reduction; those
earning less than $25,000 qualify for a 50% fee reduction.
On February 5, 2000, the Board again amended article 1,
section 7.1 of its rules and regulations to give a member whose
application for fee scaling is denied the opportunity for review
of the denial by the Board's Committee on Administration and
Finance or its designee. The amendments also specify the docu-
mentation required to prove eligibility for fee scaling.
At its April 2001 meeting, the Board again modified ar-
ticle 1, section 7.1 of its rules and regulations regarding fee
scaling to extend the deadline for applying for scaled fees to
March 15 of each year, to correspond with the date late pen-
alties attach for non-scaling members.
* Minimum Continuing Legal Education. SB 144 also
made substantive changes to the Bar's MCLE program re-
quirements. Specifically, SB 144 reduces the Bar's MCLE
requirement from 36 hours every three years to 25 hours ev-
ery three years, makes express legislative findings that it is in
the public interest to continue the MCLE requirement for at-
torneys licensed to practice law, deletes a previous exception
to the MCLE requirement for etired judges, makes express
legislative findings underlying the remaining exceptions to
the requirement, and requires the Bar to provide and encour-
age the development of no-cost and low-cost programs and
materials for satisfying the MCLE requirement (with special
emphasis upon the use of Internet capabilities and computer
technology in the development and provision of these pro-
grams). [17:1 CRLR 204,206] In December 1999, the Board
published proposed amendments to Rule 958, California Rules
of Court (Minimum Continuing Legal Education) and the
Bar's MCLE Rules and Regulations to conform with the re-
quirements of SB 144. The Board accepted public comment
on the proposed changes through March 10, 2000. On June
10, 2000, the Board voted to slightly modify the proposed
changes in response to comments received and to recommend
that the California Supreme Court approve the amendments
to Rule 958. The Supreme Court approved the Bar's amend-
ments to Rule 958 on September 27, 2000.
Also in June 2000, the Board of Governors approved the
expenditure of $40,000 to conduct a poll of about 600 law-
yers concerning their opinions of the Bar's MCLE program.
The poll results will be used by the Bar's MCLE Evaluation
Commission, which was appointed in June 1999 and charged
with examining all aspects of the MCLE program and mak-
ing recommendations to the Board.
* BSA Completes SB 144-RequiredA udit. In April 2001,
the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) released State Bar of Cali-
fornia: It Has Improved Its Disciplinary Process, Steward-
ship of Members'Fees, and Administrative Practices, but Its
Cost Recovery and Controls Over Expenses Need Strength-
ening, its report on the State Bar required by SB 144. BSA
noted that after January 1, 2000, SB 144 prohibits the Bar
from using mandatory fees to support voluntary programs such
as the Conference of Delegates and its subject-matter sec-
tions, or to support certain lobbying activities that exceed the
Keller mandate; however, SB 144 authorizes the Bar to col-
lect voluntary fees to support the Conference and the sec-
tions.
BSA noted that, in response to SB 144, the Bar estab-
lished two new funds to account for the activities of the Con-
ference of Delegates and for lobbying activities outside the
scope of Keller (a separate fund for section activities was
already in place). BSA found that the Bar also took action to
ensure that mandatory fees are not used to provide adminis-
trative support for section activities.
On annual membership statements for 2000, members
were asked to make voluntary contributions of $3 to support
the Conference; these contributions totaled about $84,000.
Expenses for Conference activities for the year were approxi-
mately $70,000; according to BSA, no mandatory fees were
used to support Conference activities during 2000.
Also in response to SB 144, the Bar created the Legisla-
tive Activities Fund to account separately for revenues and
expenses related to lobbying activities that exceed the Keller
mandate. Revenues recorded to this account in 2000 included
$644,000 (from attorneys who chose to support Keller-viola-
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tive lobbying by the Bar by not taking the $5 Hudson deduc-
tion) and $35,000 in interest income. Expenses paid from this
fund were primarily payroll expenses for staff time spent on
2000 lobbying on legislation that was not chargeable to man-
datory fees. BSA noted the Bar's improved procedures in
tracking and reporting staff time spent on legislative activi-
ties. The auditor's findings and recommendations concern-
ing attorney discipline are discussed below.
* 2001 BarDues. In contrast to SB 144, SB 1367 (Schiff)
(Chapter 118, Statutes of 2000)-the Bar's dues bill for
2001 -was enacted with little or no controversy and signed
by the Governor on July 7, 2000. SB 1367 again authorizes
the Bar to collect a maximum of $395 per member for annual
dues-including $318 in basic membership fees plus $77 in
other required fees (see 2000 LEGISLATION).
* 2002 Bar Dues. At its November 2000 meeting, the
Board voted unanimously to seek 2001 legislation reducing
Bar dues by $50 for 2002. The maximum $345 annual pay-
ment would include a $295 basic membership fee, $10 for
the Bar's building fund, and $40 for the Client Security Fund.
The proposed reduction in fees was attributed to a $15 mil-
lion budget surplus caused by continuing staff shortages re-
sulting from the Bar's 1998 shutdown.
At this writing, SB 352 (Kuehl)-pending in the legisla-
ture-would enable the Bar to fulfill its promise. SB 352 is
actually a two-year dues bill that would authorize the Bar to
charge up to $310 in basic membership fees during both 2002
and 2003 (see 2001 LEGISLATION).
Bar Rebuilds Attorney Discipline System
After then-Governor Wilson vetoed the Bar's dues bill
in 1997, the Bar twice petitioned the California Supreme Court
to order attorneys to pay their license fees. When the Court
initially declined to intervene, the Bar was forced to lay off
almost 500 employees -including most of its enforcement
staff. In December 1998, the
Court granted the Bar's second Overall, as of March 1,
petition and issued a special or- inventory of 7,478 open m
der requiring all California attor- in its "backlog"-the "
neys to pay $173 to enable the Bar complex matters pendincj
to resurrect its attorney discipline months and complex matti
system. The Court appointed a than one year). That total i
special master, retired Court of
Appeal Justice Elwood Lui, 
to
oversee the Bar's expenditure of
this special charge. [17:1 CRLR 203-06; 16:2 CRLR 168-
70; 16:1 CRLR 190-94]
* Final Report on Attorney Discipline System. On March
28, 2000, Special Master Lui filed his fourth and final report
documenting the progress of the State Bar in rebuilding its at-
torney discipline system. In his initial February 1999 report,
Justice Lui reported that the Bar's discipline system faced an
unprecedented backlog of over 7,000 open complaints and re-
ports against attorneys from consumers and courts. To deal with
the backlog, the Bar instituted new prioritization policies, de-
fault rules, and early settlement conference policies, and slowly
rehired discipline system staff- including prosecutors, inves-
tigators, and support staff. Subsequent reports issued in June
and September 1999 documented progress made as the Bar
slowly worked to rebuild its discipline system.
During his term as Special Master, Justice Lui autho-
rized the hiring of 390.5 discipline-related staff; by March
11, 2000, the Bar had filled 331.5 of those positions (some
with previous Bar employees and some with new employ-
ees). Justice Lui's final report analyzed the status of enforce-
ment system staffing and the status of case backlogs at the
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, the State Bar Court, and
the Office of General Counsel, and made general recommen-
dations regarding State Bar operations and appropriate uses
for the remaining balance in the Discipline Fund, as follows:
* Office of the Chief Trial Counsel. Accumulated cases -
which now consist not only of old complaints and cases that
came in and were abated during the shutdown but also new
complaints filed since January 1999-are divided into (1) in-
quiries-written complaints about the conduct of an attorney
that are initially reviewed by the intake unit of the Office of
the Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC), (2) investigations-matters
that have survived intake and are currently being investigated
by OCTC's investigative staff, and (3) trial counsel matters -
completed investigations that are being reviewed or pros-
ecuted by OCTC attorneys before the State Bar Court.
With the benefit of added staff, OCTC has substantially
reduced the number of inquiries in intake from 4,050 on March
1, 1999 to 2,201 on March 1,2000. Justice Lui noted that the
number of pending inquiries on March 1,2000 is up from the
1,697 that were pending as of his third report in September
1999. To remedy this problem, the Bar-in January 2000-
created and filled six complaint analyst positions for its in-
take unit and temporarily assigned three attorneys to review
these inquiries; the Bar believes this infusion of resources
will reduce its intake inventory to
the normal level of 1,600 soon.
00, CTC ainaine an The number of pending in-
ers (including 1,603 cases
cklog" consists of non- vestigations in OCTC decreasedfrom 2,800 on March 1, 1999, to
pending in OCTC for more 2,748 on March 1, 2000. Accord-
entory figure is down from ing to Justice Lui, OCTC ac-
knowledges that its investigations
inventory remains high, but at-
tributes this to the staff reorgani-
zation issues and the steep learning curve for new hires. Trial
counsel matters decreased from 1,450 on March 1, 1999 to
926 on March 1,2000. Overall, as of March 1, 2000, OCTC
maintained an inventory of 7,478 open matters (including
1,603 cases in its "backlog"-the "backlog" consists of non-
complex matters pending in OCTC for more than six months
and complex matters pending in OCTC for more than one
year). That total inventory figure is down from 10,572 on
March 1, 1999. In his report, Justice Lui attributed this im-
provement largely to OCTC's use of a prioritization system.








0 State Bar Court. In his final report, Justice Lui found
that as of March 1,2000, the State Bar Court had filled 27 of
its 37 authorized positions, but noted that many of the vacant
positions will remain unfilled unless and until they are justi-
fied by increases in the State Bar Court's workload. As of
March 1,2000, 356 open cases remained in the Hearing De-
partment and 42 open cases were pending in the Review De-
partment. As of March 3, 2000, the State Bar Court reported
that 26 cases were held in abatement, the majority of which
were proceedings in which there was a mental competency
proceeding pending or in which a recommendation of disbar-
ment had been filed or was pending before the Supreme Court
in another proceeding.
The report found that the number of new cases initiated
in the State Bar Court remained below historical levels. In
1999, 516 new cases were filed, including 456 disciplinary
cases and 51 regulatory matters (moral character admission
matters, reinstatement petitions, and requests for involuntary
inactive enrollment). In contrast, in 1996, 901 disciplinary
proceedings and 180 regulatory proceedings were filed in the
State Bar Court; in 1997, 956 disciplinary proceedings and
168 regulatory matters were filed.
* Office of General Counsel. By March 2000, the Bar's
Office of General Counsel (OGC) had filled all authorized
staff positions. OGC reported that, as of March 3, 2000, there
were 15 discipline cases before the California Supreme Court
or on appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 pending In re
Walker petitions, and one pending request for depublication
of a Review Department decision, which OGC filed on be-
half of OCTC. In addition, OGC reported that, as of March 3,
2000, it had 66 open discipline-related civil matters, includ-
ing actions brought by complaining witnesses or respondents
against the State Bar, subpoenas for discipline records, labor-
related cases involving disciplined staff employees, and bank-
ruptcies in which the debtor owes discipline costs and/or re-
imbursement to the Client Security Fund.
* Other Recommendations. Justice Lui's final report also
contained the following recommendations concerning the
general structure and operations of the Bar, as well as sug-
gestions for the disbursement of funds remaining in the Dis-
cipline Fund:
(1) Justice Lui suggested that the current budget process
be amended to permit the Bar to budget for a three-year pe-
riod rather than a one-year period. "Currently, representatives
of the State Bar must spend a large portion of each year in
Sacramento lobbying for the State Bar's fee bill for the fol-
lowing year. Not only does this create an unhealthy obses-
sion with the annual budget, but more significantly, it pre-
cludes the State Bar from making long-term strategic plans."
Justice Lui recommended that the Bar seek legislation estab-
lishing a "rolling three-year budget," during which period the
Bar would be permitted to seek budget increases from the
legislature as necessary.
(2) The Board of Governors should focus on policy is-
sues affecting the State Bar, and permii State Bar executives
and administrators to focus on the day-to-day management
of the Bar. "Although the Board's interest in the daily affairs
of the State Bar evidences the Board's legitimate concern for
the operations of the State Bar," Lui wrote in his report to the
Supreme Court, "when the Board becomes overly involved
with such details, both the Board and the State Bar (and there-
fore its members and the public) suffer....The able and
full-time State Bar executives and administrators are in a better
position to make, and should be free to make, day-to-day
management decisions and to implement the Board's policy
directives." In this regard, Justice Lui urged the Bar to recruit
and hire as its Executive Director a strong management-ori-
ented person with full authority to make day-to-day manage-
ment and budget decisions.
(3) The Bar should continue to improve its information
management system, restructure its information systems and
technology department, create a Director of Information Sys-
tems and Technology position reporting directly to the Ex-
ecutive Director, provide for routine maintenance and updat-
ing of computer hardware and software, create staff positions
in each department to address technology-related problems,
and utilize contract services and Bar employees to maintain
and expand its Web site and online services.
(4) With respect to the discipline system itself, Justice
Lui recommended that OCTC improve and streamline its pro-
cess of drafting notices to show cause (the formal disciplin-
ary complaint); refine its procedures for determining appro-
priate sanctions; simplify the processing of default cases, in
conjunction with the State Bar Court; develop and implement,
with the State Bar Court, a minor misconduct program to deal
with minor disciplinary cases; develop and implement a vol-
unteer attorney specialist program to mediate lower-priority
cases; and improve its phone line service for judicial inquir-
ies regarding attorney discipline records. Justice Lui recom-
mended that the State Bar Court reduce the length of its opin-
ions; improve and formalize effective case management, in-
cluding procedures for Early Neutral Evaluations; and con-
duct initial and substantive status conferences.
- Fund Status. Justice Lui reported that as of March 23,
2000, more than $3.7 million in unappropriated funds re-
mained in the Discipline Fund. He suggested that the funds
be used on either the Bar's discipline functions or on the
maintenance and enhancement of State Bar technology.
Justice Lui's service as Special Master of the State Bar
Attorney Discipline Fund was concluded by order of the Su-
preme Court on July 23, 2000. Following Justice Lui's rec-
ommendations, the Court ordered that the money remaining
in the Discipline Fund be held in a separate account and that
a decision concerning their use to improve the discipline sys-
tem and the Bar's technology be made by the Bar's Senior
Executive Team, and authorized by the Executive Director.
* ABA Committee to Study Workload Standards amt
Disciplinary System in California. SB 1420 (Burton) (Chap-
ter 246, Statutes of 2000) requires the State Bar to review its
workload standards with respect to disciplinary activities "in-
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cluding, but not limited to, the State Bar Court and the Client
Security Fund, and provide guidance to the State Bar and the
Legislature in allocating resources," and submit a report to
the legislature by June 30,2001 (see 2000 LEGISLATION).
On August 26, 2000, the Board unanimously voted to ask the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline to conduct the study required under
the legislation. The ABA committee has conducted more than
40 similar reviews of state bar discipline systems since 1980.
The ABA will pay some of the costs of the review itself, but
asked for a State Bar contribution of $10,000.
* BSA Reports Improvements in Bar's Disciplinary
Process. As noted above, BSA released its SB 144-required
report on the State Bar's disciplinary process in April 2001.
The auditors found that the State Bar has made significant
progress in improving its disciplinary process since the 1998
shutdown. The audit attributed
these gains to the complaint
prioritization system that allows BSA released its SB 144,
investigators to focus on the most B a d S ar 
serious disciplinary cases-those found that the State Bar h
that pose the most significant in improving its discipli
threat of harm to the public-first, shutdown.
"The State Bar has implemented
reasonable methods for dealing with the numerous complaints
that have accumulated in its backlog of disciplinary cases,"
according to the report. Further, BSA noted that the State Bar
has revised its cost model, which should result in greater cost
recovery from attorneys being disciplined. Using the new
model, the State Bar has more than doubled the maximum
amount it can charge an attorney for the costs of investigat-
ing and pursuing disciplinary ac-
tion.
However, BSA also found
that the costs actually collected
from offending attorneys declined
in 2000 compared with amounts
collected in 1995. Of $1,079,922
billed to disciplined attorneys in
2000, the State Bar collected only
$311,061 (28.8%). The only way
the State Bar can collect these amounts is by pursuing a for-
mal court judgment against the attorney, or by adding the costs
to the attorney's annual dues bill. Since the disciplined attor-
ney may be insolvent or no longer in practice, the potential
for actual collection of this cost recovery is limited. BSA
stated: "Because the State Bar's recovery efforts are poor, it
uses a greater portion of membership fees than necessary to
support its Client Security Fund and disciplinary programs.
Consequently, members must pay a fee that is higher than
necessary." The auditors recommended that the State Bar
participate in the state's "Offset Program," which allows the
State Controller's Office and the Franchise Tax Board to off-
set from an individual's tax return any amounts owed from
state agencies. According to the Bar, legislation is required to
authorize its participation in this program, and previous ef-
forts in 1997 to obtain legislative support for this proposal
were unsuccessful. BSA also recommended that the State Bar
update its cost model using current salary costs.
SB 143 Changes State Bar Court Composition,
Appointment Authority
Effective November 1, 2000, SB 143 (Burton) (Chapter
221, Statutes of 1999) changed the composition of the State
Bar Court and transferred the appointing authority for three
of the five State Bar Court judges from the California Su-
preme Court to the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee,
and the Speaker of the Assembly. Prior to the enactment of
SB 143, the State Bar Court consisted of a hearing panel of
five judges who preside over evidentiary hearings, and a three-
judge Review Department consisting of the Presiding Judge
of the State Bar Court, one attor-
ney judge, and one non-attorney
quired report on the State judge. Each of the judges was
n April 2001. The auditors appointed by the California Su-
made significant progress preme Court upon nomination by
v process since the 1998 the court's Applicant Evaluation
and Nomination Committee. SB
143 eliminates the non-attorney
judge position on the Review Department and replaces it with
an attorney judge position. Further, SB 143 permits the Su-
preme Court to appoint only two of the five Hearing Depart-
ment judges, with the remaining three judges to be appointed
by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker
of the Assembly. According to the bill's author, the intent in
revamping the appointment authority was to bring a broader
diversity of opinion to the State
Bar Court and to make that court
more closely resemble the struc-
ture of the Commission on Judi-
cial Performance, which disci-
plines judges. The Bar took no po-
sition on SB 143 because it was
double-joined to SB 144, its dues
bill. [17:1 CRLR 209]
In January 2000, three State
Bar Court judges petitioned the California Supreme Court
for a writ of mandate, asking that the new law be struck down.
In Obrien v. Jones, the State Bar Court judges argued that the
new law politicizes the appointment process, infringes upon
the Supreme Court's own inherent power over attorney disci-
pline, and violates the state constitution's separation of pow-
ers doctrine. By a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the provisions, holding that its primary
authority over the practice of law is not defeated or materi-
ally impaired by SB 143's changes to the State Bar Court
appointment process (see LITIGATION).
In November 2000, two Review Department judges were
reappointed and three new hearing judges were appointed
under the new procedures. Senate President pro Tempore John
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Burton, the author of SB 143, appointed Senate Judiciary
Committee staff attorney Jodi Remke to a hearing judge post;
Remke previously served as a legal advocate on housing is-
sues, was a legal services attorney, and practiced real estate
law in Oakland. Remke will serve a four-year term. Assem-
bly Speaker Robert Hertzberg appointed Los Angeles attor-
ney Paul Bacigalupo as a hearing judge, replacing Madge
Watai (who was elevated to the Review Department by the
Supreme Court). Prior to his appointment, Bacigalupo was a
litigator at Castle & Lax; his appointment is for two years.
Governor Davis named Robert Talcott, a former member of
the Bar of Governors, to a six-year term as a hearing judge.
Talcott served as the president of the Los Angeles Police
Commission and is the senior and founding partner of Talcott,
Lightfoot, Vandevelde, Sadowsky, Medvene & Levine.
The Supreme Court announced its reappointment of
Judge Ronald Stovitz to the Review Department and named
Judge Watai to the Review Department to replace Kenneth
Norian, the public member of the Department whose posi-
tion was eliminated by SB 143. Stovitz has been a Review
Department judge since 1989 when the State Bar Court was
established. Watai was a Superior Court judge in Los Ange-
les before becoming a hearing judge in the State Bar Court.
Diversion Program for Impaired Attorneys
At its January 26, 2001 meeting, the Board of Governors
agreed to cosponsor legislation to create an Attorney Diver-
sion and Assistance Program for lawyers with substance abuse
or mental illness problems. The bill, SB 479 (Burton), would
require the Board to establish and administer an attorney di-
version and assistance program (see 2001 LEGISLATION).
As amended April 30, 2001, SB 479 would fund the program
through an annual charge of $10 to each active member of
the Bar. The bill would add sections 6230-6238 to the Busi-
ness and Professions Code. New section 6230 would state
the intent of the legislature that the Bar "seek ways and means
to identify and rehabilitate attorneys with impairment due to
abuse of dangerous drugs or alcohol, or due to mental illness,
affecting competency so that attorneys so afflicted may be
treated and returned to the practice of law in a manner that
will not endanger the public health and safety."
New section 6231 would provide for the establishment
and administration of the attorney diversion program, and
establish a committee to oversee the operation of the pro-
gram. The committee would consist of twelve members-
eight appointed by the Board of Governors (including one
physician and two other licensed mental health professionals
with knowledge and expertise in the identification and treat-
ment of alcoholism and substance abuse, one member of the
board of directors of a statewide nonprofit organization that
assists lawyers with alcohol or substance abuse problems, and
four attorney members-one of whom is in recovery with at
least five years' sobriety), two public members appointed by
the Governor, one public member appointed by the Speaker
of the Assembly, and one public member appointed by the
Senate Rules Committee. Committee members would serve
three-year terms and would be authorized to adopt regula-
tions as needed to implement and operate the program. Sec-
tion 6232 would allow the committee to establish criteria for
acceptance, denial, or termination of attorneys in the diver-
sion program. Section 6232 would also provide that attor-
neys may enter the program through voluntary self-referral,
or by referral from the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel or
the State Bar Court. New section 6235 would provide that
participants in the program are responsible for all expenses
related to treatment and recovery, but would require the Bar
to establish a financial assistance program to ensure that at-
torneys would not be denied acceptance into the program
based solely on inability to pay.
At the Board's April 11, 2001 meeting, James D. Otto,
Chair of the Board's Committee on Regulation and Disci-
pline, briefed the Board concerning estimated costs and fund-
ing for the proposed diversion program. Using the Medical
Board's physician diversion program as a model, the Bar es-
timates that, after initial evaluation costs of $300-$5,000 per
participant, the cost of participation for each attorney partici-
pant will be about $5,000-$6,000 annually. A five-year mini-
mum period of participation is expected. Otto also outlined
the proposed staffing level and budget requirements to oper-
ate the program, but stated that attorneys will not be denied
access if they cannot afford the cost of the diversion program.
Bar to Improve Public Disclosure
of Attorney Discipline
Like the Web sites of many other California occupational
licensing agencies, the State Bar's Web site includes a "lic-
ensee look-up" feature enabling members of the public to
determine whether an attorney is in fact a member of the
California Bar. If so, the Bar discloses the attorney's current
membership status, address and telephone number of record,
the date of the member's admission to practice, and the name
of the college and law school attended. Unlike many other
agencies, however, the Bar does not disclose details about its
own prior disciplinary actions on its Web site; nor does it
disclose information about disciplinary charges filed, crimi-
nal convictions, civil malpractice judgments, other-state dis-
ciplinary actions, or other public information indicating un-
fitness to practice. The Bar's Web site simply reveals whether
a given attorney has a "public record of discipline" or "no
public record of discipline." If an attorney has a "public record
of discipline" and a member of the public wants more infor-
mation, he/she must write a letter to the Bar requesting that
information, and include a blank check. In other words,
whereas other agencies instantly disclose licensee miscon-
duct information on their Web sites for free, the Bar limits
disclosure to its own final disciplinary actions, charges up to
$30 for that information, and requires people to wait weeks
to get it.
The public disclosure issue has been complicated by the
Bar's fiscal status and by the pendency of a lawsuit filed by
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attorney Michael Mack challenging the Bar's public disclo-
sure policy regarding private reprovals (see LITIGATION).
At its December 1999 meeting, however, the Board's Com-
mittee on Regulation and Discipline finally recommended that
more detailed information regarding State Bar members' dis-
ciplinary records and changes in membership status be posted
on the Bar's Web site. The Committee recommended that the
following information be added to the Web site: (1) informa-
tion on changes in the membership
status of a member (including the
type of suspension or inactive en- Whereas other agencies
rollment, the year in which the misconduct information
suspension or inactive enrollment Bar limits disclosure t
was imposed, and the case num- actions, charges up to i
ber, if any, relating to the suspen-
sion or inactive enrollment); and
(2) enhanced information on disciplinary actions taken, in-
cluding the type or level of discipline imposed, the year in
which discipline was imposed, and the State Bar Court or
Supreme Court case number relating to the particular impo-
sition of discipline. Interested members of the public must
still write to the Bar and pay a charge for detailed informa-
tion on Bar disciplinary action.
However, the Committee recommended that information
regarding stipulated "private reprovals" -which, despite their
name, are public information if issued following the filing of
formal charges -not be posted on the Web site until the Bar
amends its rules of procedure; instead, members of the pub-
lic will be instructed to call the Bar for information on pri-
vate reprovals. On February 5,2000, the Board of Governors
approved the Committee's proposal, and subsequently
amended Rule 270 of the Bar's Rules of Procedure to clarify-
effective July 1,2000-that private reprovals issued after the
filing of a notice to show cause (so-called "private reprovals
with public disclosure") are public information and will be
disclosed on the Bar's Web site; private reprovals imposed
prior to the filing of a notice to show cause will not be posted
on the Bar's Web site or disclosed in response to public in-
quiries. In other words, information about "private reprovals
with public disclosure" will appear on the Bar's Web site if
they are issued after July 1, 2000; if they were issued prior to
that date, the Web site will instruct an interested party to call
the Bar for more information.
On May 17,2000, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
dismissed attorney Mack's challenge to the Bar's disclosure
of his private reproval. As a result, Bar senior management
unanimously recommended that the Committee on Regula-
tion and Discipline reconsider its February 2000 decision,
and instead treat all "private reprovals with public disclosure"
equally by disclosing all of them on the Bar's Web site re-
gardless of when they were issued. Staff argued that all infor-
mation on "private reprovals with public disclosure" is pub-
lic anyway, and posting that information on the Web site would
benefit the public and lighten staff workload. At its August
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disclosure of "private reprovals with public disclosure" im-
posed prior to July 1,2000.
At this writing, the Bar has not yet implemented the
Board's February 2000 decision.
Multidisciplinary Practice
Since 1999, both the ABA and the State Bar have
struggled with the "multidisciplinary practice" (MDP) con-
cept, under which lawyers could
share fees and establish business
nstantly disclose licensee partnerships with nonlawyers-
their Web sites for free, the both of which are prohibited un-
its own final disciplinary der current rules of professional
0 for that information, and conduct.
eks to get it. In June 1999, the ABA's
Commission on Multidisciplin-
ary Practice recommended that the ABA amend its model rules
to "permit lawyers, subject to carefully defined standards, to
deliver services to clients through a new practice vehicle, a
multidisciplinary practice." The Commission defined an MDP
as "a partnership, professional corporation, or other associa-
tion or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has
as one, but not all of its purposes, the delivery of legal ser-
vices to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds
itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal,
services. It includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins
with one or more other professional firms to provide services,
and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of
the arrangement." Under the recommendation, lawyers in
MDPs would remain subject to all rules of professional con-
duct, except that they would be permitted to form an MDP
and share legal fees with a nonlawyer in an MDP for the pur-
pose of the delivery of legal services. Further, the MDP would
be subject to certain certification and audit procedures de-
signed to protect the interests of clients and the public while
maintaining the core values of the legal profession-"spe-
cifically, professional independence of judgment, the protec-
tion of confidential client information, and loyalty to the cli-
ent through the avoidance of conflict of interest." The ABA
Commission stressed that its recommendation does not per-
mit a nonlawyer to deliver legal services.
The Commission's initial recommendation would have
required the amendment of ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.4, which prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees
with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer
if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the prac-
tice of law. The ABA's adoption of the recommendation
(which, absent action by the State Bar to amend California's
Rules of Professional Conduct, is not binding in California)
would have created an exception to Model Rule 5.4 in the
case of MDPs that conform to nine specified safeguards.
In July 1999, the Board of Governors approved a recom-
mendation from the Bar's Committee on Professional Respon-
sibility and Conduct (COPRAC) that the Board instruct its
delegates to the 1999 ABA convention to suggest deferral of
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the MDP issue until the ABA further studies and solicits com-
ments from outside the ABA on this important issue. At its
August 1999 meeting, the ABA's House of Delegates consid-
ered the MDP Commission's recommendation, but voted 304-
98 to defer action until the issue has been further studied by
state and local bar associations and the ABA itself. [17:1 CRLR
207-08] The ABA resolution said
that the ABA should make no
changes to the Model Rules until In July 2000, after two
additional study demonstrates that discussion of the issue, t
such changes "will further the pub- again rejected the rec
lic interest without sacrificing or Commission, voting by a
compromising lawyer indepen- ary practice is "inconsis
dence and the legal profession's the legal profession."
tradition of loyalty to clients."
In response to the ABA's August 1999 resolution, the MDP
Commission conducted more public hearings and solicited ad-
ditional comment with respect to this issue and issued an up-
dated background report in December 1999. At its February
2000 midyear meeting, the ABA conducted a Town Hall Meet-
ing and webcast on multidisciplinary practice. On March 22,
2000, the MDP Commission issued a "Draft of a Possible Rec-
ommendation to the ABA House of Delegates" with a narrower
proposal than that contained in its 1999 report. The 2000 re-
port and recommendation was posted on the ABA's Web site
in May 2000. The MDP Commission recommended:
* Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with
nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal
and nonlegal professional services (multidisciplinary prac-
tice), provided that the lawyers have the control and author-
ity necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering
of legal services. The term "nonlawyer professionals" means
members of recognized professions or other disciplines that
are governed by ethical standards.
* This recommendation must be implemented in a man-
ner that protects the public and preserves the core values of
the legal profession, including competence, independence of
professional judgment, protection of confidential client in-
formation, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of con-
flicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.
• Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and
adopt such additional enforcement procedures as are needed
to implement these principles and to protect the public inter-
est.
. The prohibition on nonlawyers delivering legal services
and the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of pro-
fessional conduct should not be altered.
- Passive investment in a multidisciplinary practice should
not be permitted.
Simultaneously, in May 2000, then-State Bar President
Andy Guilford appointed a Task Force on Multidisciplinary
Practice and charged it with determining whether there are
viable MDP models for California that preserve the critical
role of the attorney as an officer of the court in the adminis-
tration of justice and the "core values" of that role.
In July 2000, after two years of investigation and discus-
sion of the issue, the ABA's House of Delegates again re-
jected the recommendation of the MDP Commission, voting
by a 3-1 margin that multidisciplinary practice is "inconsis-
tent with the core values of the legal profession." The House
of Delegates also voted against a resolution of the MDP Com-
mission, supported by the Califor-
nia delegation, to defer action on
ars of investigation and MDP until more reports on the is-
eBA's House of Delegates sue from 33 state bars-including
mendation of the MDP California's-are received. The
margin that multidisciplin- House of Delegates thanked and
t with the core values of discharged the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, essen-
tially referring all future MDP is-
sues to its Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility.
At this writing, the State Bar's Task Force on
Multidisciplinary Practice is still engaged in its study of vari-
ous MDP models, and is expected to submit its report and
findings to the Board of Governors in mid-2001.
Ethics 2000 Commission Releases
Proposed Changes to Attorney Ethics Rules
On November 27, 2000, a blue-ribbon ABA commission
called the "Ethics 2000 Commission" released its proposals to
revise professional ethics rules for attorneys-proposals that
prompted much scrutiny and attention from attorney groups
across California and the United States. The Ethics 2000 re-
port does not amend the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct-such action could occur only through the ABA's
House of Delegates. Further, the Model Rules themselves are
not binding unless adopted by a state. At this writing, ABA
delegates are scheduled to convene and address the suggested
changes at their annual meeting in Chicago in August 2001.
Although the ABA's Model Rules are not binding in Cali-
fornia, changes to them may prompt the legislature to amend
the State Bar Act or the State Bar to recommend revisions to
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Notable changes in the Eth-
ics 2000 proposal include modifications to rules regarding dis-
closure of client confidences, discipline of law firms, and stan-
dards for conflicts of interest. The Commission proposes that
lawyers should be allowed to disclose client confidences to
prevent or mitigate financial harm or fraud. Currently, disclo-
sure of client confidences under the existing Model Rules is
allowed only to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.
Critics of the proposal claim that such disclosures would vio-
late fiduciary duties inherent in a lawyer's role as a profes-
sional and undermine client confidence. Business and Profes-
sions Code section 6068(e) requires that an attorney keep cli-
ent confidences "inviolate" and provides no exception for im-
minent death, bodily harm, financial harm, or fraud.
The Commission's proposal allowing the discipline of
law firms is also controversial. The proposed rule would re-
quire a law firm to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that







the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct." Critics point out logistical problems with
disciplining a firm, which is not licensed by the state; only
individual attorneys are licensed and subject to discipline
under the existing system.
The Commission also suggests changes in the conflict of
interest rules to allow a law firm to "screen off" a lawyer in
order to avoid conflicts of interest involving the lawyer's
former clients. Other proposals would require written fee
agreements between attorneys and clients and would prohibit
attorneys from having sexual relationships with clients; Cali-
fornia already has laws in these latter two areas.
Task Force on Multijurisdictional Practice
SB 1782 (Morrow) (Chapter 247, Statutes of 2000) states
the legislature's intent that the California Supreme Court adopt
rules allowing attorneys who are licensed in other states to be
admitted to practice law in California without passing the Cali-
fornia Bar examination, and requests the Supreme Court to
establish a task force to study the issue of reciprocity for Bar
admissions (see 2000 LEGISLATION). In response, the Su-
preme Court created an 18-member panel to study this issue,
chaired by former Bar president Raymond Marshall of
McCutchen Doyle Brown & Enersen. At his writing, the task
force is expected to make its recommendations to the Su-
preme Court in fall 2001.
The ABA has formed a Commission on Multijurisdic-
tional Practice of Law, which has also been studying the is-
sue of multijurisdictional practice and is expected to issue its
final recommendations in May 2001. At its January 2001
meeting, the Board of Governors voted to ask the ABA com-
mission to extend its consideration of this issue to allow the
State Bar and other states more time to provide input.
Bar Considers Shorter Examination
In December 2000, State Bar executives met with law
school deans from around the state to discuss proposals to
shorten the three-day Bar examination to two days, and to
discuss the possible addition of new areas of law to the ex-
amination. The proposed changes are intended to cut costs of
administering the examination and to make the test less bur-
densome for applicants. The Bar is considering either elimi-
nating the California Performance Test or adopting the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiner's Multistate Performance
Test, which is 90 minutes shorter than California's perfor-
mance test. The Bar suggests adding to or expanding the es-
say portion of the test to address business associations, civil
procedure, contracts and commercial law, evidence, and fam-
ily law. At this writing, no action on the proposal has been
taken.
Recent Bar Exam Pass Rates
The July 1999 Bar examination had a 51.2% pass rate.
First-time takers enjoyed a 68.5% pass rate; only 18.9% of
repeat applicants passed. First-time applicants who attended
ABA-accredited law schools had a pass rate of 68.5%; first-
time applicants who attended schools accredited by the State
Bar had a 33.3% pass rate.
For the February 2000 examination, the pass rate was
40%, as compared to 41.1% on the February 1999 examina-
tion. First-time takers had a 51.3% pass rate; 34.7% of repeat
takers passed the examination. Graduates of ABA-accredited
schools who took the test for the first time had a 50.1% pass
rate; first-time takers who attended State Bar-approved
schools had a 30.3% pass rate.
The overall pass rate for the July 2000 bar examination
was 55.3%. First-time takers enjoyed a 64.3% pass rate; 25.3%
of repeat takers were successful. First-time applicants from
ABA-accredited law schools passed at a 71.7% rate; only
28.6% of those attending State Bar-accredited schools passed.
2000 LEGISLATION
SB 1367 (Schiff), as amended March 9, 2000, extends
the Bar's 2000 basic membership fee of $318 to 2001. To-
gether with other fees totaling $77, this bill authorizes the
State Bar to collect $395 in total Bar dues during 2001. This
provision was contingent on the passage of SB 1420 (Bur-
ton), which became law on August 24,2000 (see below). SB
1367 was signed into law on July 7, 2000 (Chapter 118, Stat-
utes of 2000).
SB 1420 (Burton), as amended June 27, 2000, repeals
existing law authorizing the Board of Governors to screen
and rate all applicants for appointment or reappointment as a
State Bar Court Hearing Department judge, and instead pro-
vides that those applicants must be screened and reviewed by
an applicant evaluation committee as directed by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court (see LITIGATION). SB 1420 also pro-
vides that the Review Department will employ a de novo stan-
dard of review in reviewing decisions, orders, or rulings by a
hearing judge of the Hearing Department, as established by
the California Supreme Court in February 2000 in Rule 951.5
of the California Rules of Court (or as otherwise specified by
the Supreme Court in Rule 951.5).
Existing law authorizes the Board of Governors to ap-
pointpro tempore State Bar Court Hearing Department judges
when a regular judge is unavailable to serve without delay-
ing a proceeding. SB 1420 also allows the California Supreme
Court to appoint pro tempore State Bar Court Hearing De-
partment judges.
Finally, SB 1420 requires the Bar to review its workload
standards to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of its
disciplinary activities, including but not limited to the State
Bar Court and the Client Security Fund, and provide guid-
ance to the Bar and the legislature in allocating resources.
The standards must be used to reassess the numbers and clas-
sifications of staff required to conduct the activities of the
State Bar's disciplinary activities. The results of the study-
which must cover calendar years 1998, 1999, and 2000-
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must be submitted to the legislature by June 30, 2001 (see
MAJOR PROJECTS). Governor Davis signed this bill on
August 24, 2000 (Chapter 246, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1782 (Morrow), as amended June 29, 2000, states
the legislature's intent that the Supreme Court of California
adopt rules allowing admission to practice in California to
attorneys licensed in other states without passing the Califor-
nia Bar examination; and requests the Supreme Court to es-
tablish a task force to study the issue of reciprocity for Bar
admissions. The bill specifies that the task force should con-
sider all of the following factors: years of practice in other
states; admission to practice law in another state; specializa-
tion of the attorney's practice in another state; the attorney's
intended scope of practice in California; the admission re-
quirements in the state(s) in which the attorney has been li-
censed to practice; reciprocity with and comity with other
states; moral character requirements; disciplinary implica-
tions; and consumer protection (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
SB 1782 was signed by the Governor on August 24, 2000
(Chapter 247, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2107 (Scott), as amended August 24, 2000, prima-
rily pertains to the marketing of Medicare supplemental and
long-term insurance policies to senior citizens, and clarifies
the definition of "financial abuse" for the purpose of the El-
der Abuse and Dependent Civil Protection Act. As it relates
to the Bar, AB 2107 requires the State Bar to file an annual
report to the legislature about financial services provided by
lawyers to elders. The report must include the number of com-
plaints filed and investigations initiated, the types of charges
made, and the number and nature of disciplinary actions taken
by the State Bar. The Governor signed AB 2107 on Septem-
ber 13, 2000 (Chapter 442, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2069 (Corbett), as amended August 18, 2000, re-
quires the State Bar to conduct a study concerning the legal
and professional responsibility issues that may arise as a re-
sult of the relationship between an attorney and an insurer
when an attorney is retained by the insurer to represent an
insured, and the attorney is subsequently retained to repre-
sent'a party against another party insured by the insurer. The
Bar must submit a report on the study and any recommenda-
tions to the legislature and the Su-
preme Court by July 1,2001. This
bill, sponsored by California De- AB 1858 (Romero), as ame
fense Counsel, is designed to ad- specific advertising re
dress issues raised by the decision members who practice in
in State Farm Mutual Automobile naturalization law.
Insurance Co. v. Federal Insur-
ance Co., 72 Cal. App. 4th 1422 (1999), review denied Sept.
29, 1999. In this case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held
that a law firm is disqualified from bringing an action against
an insurance company while representing a policyholder of
that same company in an unrelated insurance defense case.
The court said that such representation is inconsistent with
an attorney's duty of undivided loyalty under Rule 3-310 of
the Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct. Governor Davis
signed AB 2069 on September 16, 2000 (Chapter 472, Stat-
utes of 2000).
SB 1988 (Speier), as amended August 25, 2000, deals
with insurance fraud. As it relates to attorneys, SB 1988 makes
engaging in insurance fraud grounds for disbarment or sus-
pension of an attorney and requires the State Bar to investi-
gate such fraud unless the district attorney objects to such an
investigation. Governor Davis signed SB 1988 on September
28, 2000 (Chapter 867, Statutes of 2000).
AB 1042 (Cedillo). Existing law requires law students
attending unaccredited law schools to pass the so-called "Baby
Bar" examination after the first year, and precludes them from
receiving credit for the first year or subsequent years of study
until they have passed the examination. As enrolled August
30, 2000, AB 1042 would have, until January 1, 2003, re-
quired a student attending an unaccredited law school to take
the "Baby Bar," after which the student would be notified,
based on his/her score, of the probability of passing the gen-
eral Bar examination. It further would have provided that,
until January 1,2003, passing the "Baby Bar" is not a condi-
tion for receiving credit for law study or for eligibility to take
the general Bar examination. As of January 1, 2003, the bill
would have repealed the "Baby Bar" requirement for students
attending unaccredited law schools.
Following former Governor Wilson's lead on two simi-
lar bills during the 1990s [15:4 CRLR 250; 14:4 CRLR 215],
Governor Davis vetoed AB 1042 on September 25,2000, say-
ing, "The Baby Bar was established in 1935 by the State Bar
to protect those individuals ill-suited for a legal career from
expending further time, money, and effort, and to provide
others with the opportunity to measure the quality of the edu-
cation from unaccredited law schools. The California Supreme
Court has agreed that there is a legitimate state interest in
requiring this examination because the Baby Bar protects stu-
dents by informing them about their ability to practice law,
and the results of the examination indicate to the student the
quality of the legal education the student is receiving. For
these reasons, I cannot sign this bill."
AB 1858 (Romero), as amended August 18, 2000, en-
acts specific advertising requirements for State Bar members
who practice in the areas of im-
migration and naturalization law.
ed August 18,2000, enacts This bill requires each member of
irements for State Bar the State Bar to include in all ad-
areas of immigration and vertisements offering to provide
services relating to immigration
and naturalization a statement hat
he/she is a member of the State Bar and is licensed to prac-
tice law in California. Law firms or corporations advertising
such services are also required to include in these advertise-
ments a statement that all legal services are provided by an
active member of the State Bar or under the supervision of an
active member of the State Bar. This bill further specifies
that those required statements be in the same language as the
advertisement. Advertisements in telephone and business di-





rectories that state only the name, address, and telephone num-
ber of the entity, as well as Bar members employed by public
agencies or by nonprofit entities registered with the Secre-
tary of State, are exempt from these requirements. AB 1858
makes violation of these provisions cause for discipline by
the State Bar.
Existing law regulates the practice of "immigration con-
sultants," defined as persons who provide nonlegal assistance
or advice in an immigration matter. With certain exceptions,
this bill requires immigration consultants who print, display,
publish, distribute, or broadcast, or who cause to be printed,
displayed, published, distributed, or broadcasted, any adver-
tisement for services as an immigration consultant within the
meaning of Business and Professions Code section 22441, to
include in that advertisement a clear and conspicuous state-
ment that the immigration consultant is not an attorney. The
bill also increases the civil penalty for the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by immigration consultants from $10,000 to
$100,000. Governor Davis signed AB 1858 on September 24,
2000 (Chapter 674, Statutes of 2000).
AB 1761 (Brewer), as amended August 18, 2000, de-
fines the term "paralegal" and specifies the qualifications for
practice as a paralegal. The bill also creates educational re-
quirements for paralegals, and sets forth permissible parale-
gal activities. This legislation is intended to protect consum-
ers from untrained and unqualified professionals who per-
form poor quality legal services.
New Business and Professions Code section 6450 de-
fines "paralegal" as a person who contracts with or is em-
ployed by an attorney, law firm, corporation, governmental
agency, or other entity, who performs substantial specifically
delegated tasks under the direction and supervision of an ac-
tive member of the State Bar or an attorney practicing law in
the California federal courts. The terms "paralegal," "legal
assistant," "attorney assistant," "freelance paralegal," "inde-
pendent paralegal," and "contract paralegal," are synonymous
with "paralegal" for purposes of the new law. The new provi-
sions do not apply to a "legal document assistant" or "unlaw-
ful detainer assistant" as defined in Business and Professions
Code section 6400. Paralegals employed by the State of Cali-
fornia are specifically exempted from these rules.
Under AB 1761, a paralegal may not contract with or be
employed by a person other than an attorney to provide para-
legal services. Tasks that may be performed by a paralegal
under the supervision of an attorney include case planning,
development, and management; legal research; interviewing
clients; fact gathering and retrieving information; drafting and
analyzing legal documents; and collecting, compiling, and
utilizing technical information to make an independent deci-
sion and recommendation to the supervising attorney. A para-
legal may also represent a client before state or federal ad-
ministrative agencies if such representation is allowed by
agency statute or regulation.
A paralegal may not provide legal advice, represent a
client in court, or otherwise engage in conduct that consti-
tutes the unauthorized practice of law. For example, a parale-
gal may not select, explain, draft, or recommend the use of
any legal document to or for any person other than the super-
vising attorney. The paralegal may also not act as a runner or
capper to solicit clients for an attorney.
This bill requires a paralegal to have either (1) a certifi-
cate of completion or a degree from an approved paralegal
program or postsecondary institution; (2) a bachelor's degree
combined with one year of legal experience under the super-
vision of a qualified attorney; or (3) a high school diploma or
GED and three years of supervised legal experience. The third
option will sunset in 2003. The supervising attorney must be
an active member of the State Bar for at least three years or
have practiced in California federal courts for three years.
AB 1761 also requires paralegals to complete four hours
of continuing education in legal ethics every four years and
four hours in either general law or a specialized area of law
every two years. The courses must meet the same require-
ments as attorney MCLE. The bill requires the supervising
attorney to certify completion of the continuing education
requirements and requires the paralegal to keep a record of
the certification.
The bill also makes it unlawful for an individual to hold
him/herself out as a paralegal on any advertisement, letterhead,
business card, sign, or elsewhere unless he/she meets the edu-
cational requirements and works under the supervision of a
qualified attorney. The business card of a paralegal must in-
clude the name of the law firm employing the paralegal or a
statement hat the paralegal is employed by or contracting with
a licensed attorney. Violation of the unlawful activities rules or
the advertising rules in this bill is an infraction punishable by a
fine of up to $2,500 as to each consumer to whom a violation
occurs. Subsequent violations are misdemeanors punishable
by a fine of up to $2,500 or imprisonment of up to one year.
Further, the attorney who uses the services of a paralegal is
liable for any harm caused as a result of the paralegal's negli-
gence, misconduct, or violation of the statute governing para-
legals. Governor Davis signed AB 1761 on September 13,2000
(Chapter 439, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2810 (Pacheco), as amended August 10, 2000, clari-
fies the bonding requirements for legal document assistants
(LDAs) and unlawful detainer assistants (UDAs). The bill
requires LDAs and UDAs to post a single bond of $25,000 in
favor of the State of California for the benefit of any person
who is harmed as a result of a violation of the UDA or LDA
law. The bond will indicate the name of the county in which
it is filed, but is applicable statewide. This bill clarifies exist-
ing law by requiring an LDA or UDA to register in any county
in which he/she performs acts for which registration is re-
quired (deemed secondary registration). Any registration in a
county other than the county of the person's place of busi-
ness is required to state the person's principal place of busi-
ness and provide proof that the registrant has satisfied the
bonding requirement. The Governor signed AB 2810 on Sep-
tember 8, 2000 (Chapter 386, Statutes of 2000).
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SB 1927 (Haynes), as amended August 7, 2000, would
have reduced the amount of the bond required of LDAs who
limit their practice solely to assisting parties in small claims
court in Riverside County from $25,000 to $5,000. Governor
Davis vetoed this bill on September 7, 2000. In his veto mes-
sage, the Governor said: "There has been no evidence that
the current registration requirement is overly burdensome or
that it is limiting the availability of legal assistants. In addi-
tion, consumers who use small claims court often are the ones
most in need of the protection that registration and bonding
provide. There is nothing unique to Riverside County that
would warrant that consumers who live there should not re-
ceive the same level of protection as consumers elsewhere in
the state."
2001 LEGISLATION
SB 352 (Kuehl), as amended April 30, 2001, is a two-
year Bar dues bill applicable to 2002 and 2003. SB 352 would
decrease the Bar's 2001 maximum basic membership fee from
$318 to $310, and require the Bar to permit members to de-
duct $5 per year if they do not wish to support Bar lobbying
activities that exceed the Keller mandate (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). SB 352 would also continue to authorize the
Bar to charge annual fees of $40 for its Client Security Fund,
$10 for its building fund, $25 for disciplinary activities, and
$ 10 for the new attorney diversion program contained in SB
479 (Burton), to which SB 352 is joined (see below). The bill
would also amend Business and Professions Code section
6068(f) to delete a provision imposing upon an attorney the
duty to "abstain from having an offensive personality," as
that term has been invalidated as "void for vagueness" by the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. [S. Jud]
SB 479 (Burton), as amended April 30,2001, would re-
quire the Bar to establish and administer a diversion and re-
habilitation assistance program for attorneys with substance
abuse problems or mental illness (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
The program, which would be overseen by a 12-member com-
mittee, would monitor chemically dependent and/or mentally
ill attorneys and route them to appropriate treatment, reha-
bilitation, and recovery services. The bill would authorize the
Bar to charge an annual fee of up to $10 to each member of
the State Bar to finance the program. The proposed diversion
program is modeled after the Medical Board of California's
Diversion Program for physicians with substance abuse prob-
lems and/or mental illness.
A Senate committee analysis of SB 479 quotes a Febru-
ary 2001 Senate Office of Research report as saying that
"[s]ubstance abuse and mental illnesses are factors in a sig-
nificant share of the malpractice and misconduct charges filed
against members of the legal profession. The ABA's Com-
mission on Lawyer Assistance Programs recently reported that
'a majority of [lawyer] disciplinary problems involve chemi-
cal dependency or emotional stress."' Further, an ABA com-
mission estimated that about 15-18% of the nation's lawyers
abuse alcohol or drugs, compared to only 10% of the general
population; another 10% reportedly suffer from some form
of psychological distress. [S. Jud]
SB 817 (Johnson), as introduced February 23, 2001,
is a Bar-sponsored bill that would revise one pathway of the
educational requirements for admission to the Bar. That path-
way requires a person, in addition to meeting other require-
ments, to have graduated from an accredited law school re-
quiring three years of full-time study, or four years of
part-time study in order to be eligible to take the Bar exam.
This bill would revise that requirement to instead require
the person to earn a law degree from an accredited law
school. According to the Bar, the change is intended to fo-
cus the statute on the fact that it is graduation from an ac-
credited law school, not the number of years attended, that
is the key to eligibility to take the Bar exam under this path-
way.
SB 817 would also shorten by 15 days the time period in
which a late application to take the Bar exam must be filed;
and would also permit an out-of-state attorney to take the
Attorney's Bar Exam instead of the general Bar exam when
he/she has been licensed for four years in another United States
jurisdiction, counting from the first day of the examination
(instead of from the date of the application). This bill would
except the Multistate Bar Examination portion of the Bar
examination from provisions allowing a person who has failed
the Bar examination to inspect his/her examination papers
and the grading of the papers. [S. Jud]
AB 363 (Steinberg), as amended April 26, 2001, would
enact the Public Agency Attorney Accountability Act. The
Act would make a finding by the legislature of the competing
obligations of public agency attorneys to protect the interests
of the public and to protect the confidences of their client,
and a declaration that a rule of professional conduct should
be adopted to clarify the circumstances under which public
agency attorneys may act to protect the public when doing so
may disclose client confidences.
An April 30, 2001 Assembly committee report quotes
the author as stating, "Public agency attorneys face some-
times competing obligations not faced in the private sector:
the concomitant obligations to protect both the public inter-
est and the confidentiality of client confidences. This issue
was dramatically highlighted last year in the case of Depart-
ment of Insurance attorney Cindy Ossias, who courageously
came forward to the Legislature to disclose wrongdoing on
the part of former Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush and
other agency employees that ultimately helped lead to the
resignation of Mr. Quackenbush. Ms. Ossias was offered pro-
tection from criminal prosecution for her disclosures, but she
was temporarily relieved of her job at the Department and
risked potentially serious discipline by the State Bar, includ-
ing the loss of her livelihood. Although the State Bar ulti-
mately exonerated Ms. Ossias, and Ms. Ossias was reinstated
to her position at the Department of Insurance, her case un-
derscores the need for the State Bar to quickly clarify in the
California Rules of Professional Conduct the types of cir-
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cumstances under which an attorney can seek to protect the
public interest even if that mean disclosing client confidences.
Once these Rules become clear on this important issue, pub-
lic agency attorneys in California will no longer have to risk
their Bar licenses, and even their livelihoods, to protect the
public from serious government misconduct" (see agency
report on DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE for further in-
formation). [A. Jud]
AB 935 (Hertzberg), as amended April 16, 2001, would
create the Public Interest Attorney Loan Repayment Program
to provide loan repayment assistance, not to exceed $15,000
per year, for licensed attorneys who practice or agree to prac-
tice in public interest areas of the law. The program would be
administered by the state Student Aid Commission (SAC).
AB 935 would require that SAC create an advisory commit-
tee, to include one representative from the State Bar, one rep-
resentative from the California Commission on Access to
Justice, one representative with at least ten years experience
managing a nonprofit legal services organization, and not
more than three representatives from California law schools,
to guide SAC in adopting regulations to administer the pro-
gram, publicizing the program, selecting eligible participants,
and other duties. The bill would create the Public Interest
Attorney Loan Repayment Endowment Account, which would
consist of funds appropriated by the legislature for the pro-
gram, private contributions to the program, and receipts from
participant repayments. The bill would require each recipient
to practice for one year in a public interest area of the law for
each year of loan repayment received, and would restrict
grants to a maximum of five years per participant. At this
writing, the bill appropriates no funds from the state into the
endowment account. [A. Appr]
SB 1194 (Romero), as amended April 30, 2001, would
permit those injured by persons practicing without a license
to be awarded damages and other relief in an action brought
by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney
acting as a public prosecutor. This bill would also make it
unlawful for a person to disseminate a statement indicating
that he/she is acting as an immigration consultant without
having filed the required $50,000 bond with the Secretary of
State. [S. Jud]
SB 1218 (Romero), as amended April 30, 2001, would
repeal Business and Professions Code section 6034, which
created the "California Legal Corps" (CLC) as an arm of the
State Bar in 1993; section 6034
authorizes the CLC to receive un-
paid residues from class action In tin a 5-2 d on-
lawsuits under Code of Civil Pro- ourinia legislativ
cedure section 384 and award
them to nonprofit organizations changes to the State Bar C
engaged in preventive law
projects, alternative dispute resolution efforts, legal support
for victims of disasters, and other activities designed to help
improve access to justice for all Californians. [13:4 CRLR
216-17] Despite much publicity by the Bar, the CLC was
never officially formed. This bill would abolish the CLC and
its section 384 authorization to receive unpaid residuals from
class action litigation, and instead provide that unpaid residu-
als from class action litigation will be paid either to nonprofit
organizations to support projects beneficial to the class or to
promote the law consistent with the objectives of the litiga-
tion, or to child advocacy programs or nonprofit legal ser-
vices programs. [S. Jud]
AB 830 (Cohn), as amended March 27, 2001, would re-
quire the Department of Aging to establish a task force to
study and make recommendations to the legislature on issues
relating to legal services for seniors. [A. Appr]
AB 913 (Steinberg), as introduced February 23, 2001,
is a "spot bill" stating legislative intent that the provision of
pro bono legal services is the professional responsibility of
California attorneys as an integral part of the privilege of prac-
ticing law in this state. The bill makes findings that in recent
years, many law firms in California have been fortunate to
experience a robust increase in average attorney income; how-
ever, during the same time period, there has regrettably been
a decline in the average number of pro bono services being
rendered by attorneys in this state. Without legislative action
to bolster pro bono activities, there is a serious risk that the
provision of critical pro bono legal services will continue to
substantially decrease. [A. Jud]
AB 1083 (Bates), as amended April 25, 2001, would
clarify provisions enacted in AB 1761 (Brewer) (see 2000
LEGISLATION). This bill would require that a person hold
him/herself out as a paralegal in order to be considered a para-
legal (such that the person is required to meet AB 1761's edu-
cation and training requirements), and would exclude per-
sons performing certain law-related tasks or jobs from the
definition of "paralegal" if they are employed by a lawyer or
law firm and work under the direction and supervision of a
member of the State Bar. [A. Jud]
LITIGATION
During 2000-01, the California Supreme Court decided
three cases challenging the constitutionality of alleged legisla-
tive incursion into the Court's sacred territory-the State Bar's
attorney discipline system. Despite the Court's recent affirma-
tion of its "inherent constitutional authority over the discipline
of licensed attorneys in this state" in In Re Attorney Discipline
System, 19 Cal. 4th 582 (1998) [16:1 CRLR 193-94], the Court
upheld the legislature's actions in
all three cases.
iphV, the California Supreme In the first case, In Re Ma-
upheld the constitutionality son Harry Rose V, 22 Cal. 4th 430
y-prescribed structural (Mar. 6,2000), the California Su-
preme Court-in a 5-2 deci-
sion - upheld the constitutionality
of significant legislatively-prescribed structural changes to
the State Bar Court. Attorney Mason Harry Rose V- an at-
torney who suffered at least three disciplinary suspensions
between 1989 and 1995, and who was subsequently recom-





mended for disbarment by a State Bar Court hearing judge
and the Review Department-challenged the validity of the
post-1989 State Bar Court, and particularly the Supreme
Court's "finality rules" which enable it to summarily deny an
attorney's petition for review of a disbarment recommenda-
tion of the State Bar Court.
Prior to 1989, the State Bar's disciplinary system was
operated primarily with the assistance of volunteer attorneys
who acted as referees and made recommendations to the Board
of Governors; the Board, in turn, made disciplinary recom-
mendations to the California Supreme Court. The Court rou-
tinely granted petitions for review of recommendations of
disbarment or suspension, and issued written opinions fol-
lowing briefing and oral argument. In fact, the Court-which
expressed public dissatisfaction with the quality of State Bar
disciplinary decisionmaking in Maltaman v. State Bar, 43 Cal.
3d 924 (1987)-often reviewed and modified recommenda-
tions forwarded by the State Bar without the filing of any
petition for review. [7:3 CRLR 1]
Effective January 1, 1989, however, the provisions of
SB 1498 (Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988) became
effective. Among many other things, SB 1498 (Presley)-
drafted by Professor Robert C.
Fellmeth during his five-year ten-
ure as State Bar Discipline Moni- Rose argued that the CoL
tor pursuant to now-repealed Busi- him of procedural due prc
ness and Professions Code section right to a judicial determ
6086.9-did away with the use of be disbarred.
volunteers to investigate, pros-
ecute, and hear attorney discipline cases, and replaced the
volunteer system with professional investigators, professional
prosecutors, and a professional State Bar Court that is not
appointed or controlled by the attorney-dominated Board of
Governors. Under the 1988 legislation, all State Bar Court
judges were appointed directly by the California Supreme
Court. The State Bar Court consists of a Hearing Department,
whose full-time judges preside over individual evidentiary
hearings in State Bar attorney discipline matters and render
written decisions recommending whether the respondent at-
torney should be disciplined. Any disciplinary decision is re-
viewable by the State Bar Court Review Department at the
request of the attorney or the State Bar. In Review Depart-
ment proceedings, matters are fully briefed, the parties are
given an opportunity for oral argument, and the Review De-
partment issues a written opinion recommending discipline.
Judicial review of a State Bar Court decision is governed
by Business and Professions Code section 6081 et seq. and
by Rule 950 et seq. of the California Rules of Court (the so-
called "finality rules"). Under these laws, any recommenda-
tion of suspension or disbarment must be transmitted, along
with the accompanying record, to the California Supreme
Court after the State Bar Court's decision becomes final. An
aggrieved attorney may file a petition to review, reverse, or
modify such a State Bar Court decision with the Supreme
Court within 60 days of its issuance, and the petitioner has
the burden of establishing error. When no petition is filed,
the decision or order of the State Bar Court is final and en-
forceable. When a petition is filed, Supreme Court review of
the case is discretionary. SB 1498 amended Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6087, which generally reserves to the
California Supreme Court all authority to disbar or discipline
attorneys in California, to provide that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, the Supreme Court may by rule au-
thorize the State Bar to take any action otherwise reserved to
the Supreme Court in any matter arising under this chapter or
initiated by the Supreme Court; provided, however, that any
such action by the State Bar shall be reviewable by the Su-
preme Court pursuant to such rules as the Supreme Court
may prescribe." Rule 954(a) of the California Rules of Court,
approved by the Supreme Court in 1991, sets forth the cir-
cumstances under which the Supreme Court will grant re-
view. In the event the Supreme Court denies review, Rule
954(b) provides that the denial "shall constitute a final judi-
cial determination on the merits and the recommendation of
the State Bar Court shall be filed as an order of the Supreme
Court." [11:2 CRLR 180; 11:1 CRLR 148]
As noted above, the Review Department recommended
disbarment of attorney Rose, who
sought review of that recommen-
summary denial deprived dation in the California Supreme
ss and of his constitutional Court. The Supreme Court sum-
tion of whether he should marily denied Rose's petition for
review without oral argument or
a written decision explaining the
reasons for its denial. Rose argued that the Court's summary
denial deprived him of procedural due process and of his con-
stitutional right to a judicial determination of whether he
should be disbarred. Specifically, Rose claimed that (1) the
procedural scheme violates his right to de novo review by an
Article VI court of the State Bar Court's determination of
questions of law and fact; (2) a summary denial of review
violates Article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution,
which provides that decisions of the Supreme Court that de-
termine "causes" must be in writing with reasons stated; and
(3) the procedure violates Article VI, section 2 of the Califor-
nia Constitution, which -according to Rose -confers a right
to oral argument.
Rose first argued that he is entitled to judicial review of
the State Bar's administrative decision by a court vested with
"judicial power" under Article VI, section 1 of the California
Constitution. Courts authorized to exercise "judicial power"
include the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts,
and municipal courts; Article VI, section 1 does not include
the State Bar Court. In rejecting this argument that the legis-
lature has improperly invested the State Bar Court with "ju-
dicial power" by rendering its decisions final upon the Su-
preme Court's denial of a petition for review, the Court reit-
erated that-in Business and Professions Code section 6087-
the legislature has expressly reserved to the Supreme Court
(and not the State Bar Court) the "judicial power" over attor-





ney discipline. The State Bar Court is simply an administra-
tive arm of the Supreme Court which makes recommenda-
tions to the Supreme Court; it exercises none of the "judicial
power" of the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court de-
nies a petition for review, it is not the State Bar Court's rec-
ommendation that becomes "final"; what becomes "final" is
the Supreme Court's order denying the petition for review
and adopting the State Bar Court's recommendation as its
own, and that decision is guided by the criteria the Supreme
Court has established for itself in Rule 954(a). "[O]ur denial
of a petition for review of a State Bar Court disciplinary de-
cision is a final judicial determination on the merits for pur-
poses of establishing federal jurisdiction and res
judicata. ...[T]he circumstance that we may summarily deny
such a petition does not preclude an attorney from having an
adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims in this
court... .The procedural scheme for our review of State Bar
Court decisions does not invest the State Bar Court with judi-
cial power, nor does it deprive an attorney of the right to an
independent determination, by an article VI court, of whether
he or she should be disbarred or suspended."
The Supreme Court also rejected Rose's contention un-
der Article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution, which
provides that "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court ...that deter-
mine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated." Here,
the Supreme Court found that its denial of a petition for re-
view of the State Bar Court's recommendation of disbarment
or suspension does not decide a "cause" within the meaning
of this provision because, histori-
cally, the term "cause" has been
limited to criminal actions and Specifically, petitioners
civil suits-not specialized pro- Surem ort hscpie
ceedings such as attorney disci- Bar's attorney discipline
pline matters. The Supreme Court legislature's attempt to
similarly rejected Rose's conten- its power to select and
tion that Article VI, section 2 of hearing judges and to eli
the California Constitution con- inte Revie
fers a right to oral argument prior powers doctrine.
to issuance of the order.
Based upon the foregoing rulings, the Supreme Court
rejected Rose's contention that "because the attorney receives
no indication that the merits have ever been considered by
judicial minds," its summary denial of his petition for review
fails to afford him procedural due process as guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution. In the words of the Court, "our sum-
mary denial of such a petition for review necessarily includes
a judicial determination on the merits (rule 954(b)), includ-
ing an independent evaluation of the facts and the law."
Justices Joyce Kennard and Janice Rogers Brown dis-
sented. Comparing the Bar's attorney discipline system to
the Administrative Procedure Act that governs discipline of
other regulated professionals, Justice Kennard argued that
"[a]ttorneys are the only persons whose state occupational
licenses can be revoked or suspended without a judicial hear-
ing. When the right to continue practicing a trade or profes-
sion is at stake, only attorneys are denied their day in court."
Similarly, Justice Brown argued that "attorneys penalized for
professional misconduct get less in the way of genuine judi-
cial review of discipline than licensed nonattorneys do." In a
footnote, the majority responded to their comments by say-
ing that "attorneys are the only professional licensees who,
as a matter of right in every case, can obtain judicial review
on the merits by the highest appellate court in the state, be-
fore their license can be revoked or suspended."
In the second case, Obrien v. Jones, 23 Cal. 4th 40 (June
1, 2000), a four-member majority of the California Supreme
Court upheld provisions of SB 143 (Burton) (Chapter 221,
Statutes of 1999) that permit elected officials to appoint some
of the State Bar Court's hearing judges and eliminate a non-
lawyer judge from the State Bar Court's Review Department.
SB 143 was a controversial bill that changed the compo-
sition of the State Bar Court and the way its judges are ap-
pointed (see MAJOR PROJECTS). As noted above, the 1988
statute creating the State Bar Court required each of its judges
to be appointed directly by the California Supreme Court. As
implemented during the 1990s, the State Bar Court consisted
of a hearing panel of five judges and a three-judge Review
Department consisting of the Presiding Judge of the State Bar
Court, one attorney judge, and one non-attorney judge; each
judge was appointed by the California Supreme Court upon
the nomination of that court's Applicant Evaluation and Nomi-
nation Committee. Effective November 1,2000, SB 143 per-
mits the Supreme Court to appoint only two of the five hear-
ing judges; the remaining three
gued that the California judges are appointed by the 
Gov-
ernor, Senate Rules Committee,
aty" ovdallered tht State and Assembly Speaker. SB 143
te andualleged tht the also eliminates the non-lawyer
est the Supreme Court of
point all State Bar Court judge position on the 
Review
Department and replaces it with
ate the lay judge position an attorney judge position. 117:1
violates the separation ofCLR2]
CRLR 209]
Three sitting State Bar Court
judges whose terms were set to
expire on November 1, 2000-James Obrien, H. Kenneth
Norian (the Review Department's non-lawyer judge), and
Nancy R. Lonsdale-filed suit in January 2000, challenging
SB 143 as violative of the separation of powers provision of
the California Constitution. Specifically, petitioners argued
that the California Supreme Court has "plenary authority"
over the State Bar's attorney discipline system and alleged
that the legislature's attempt to divest the Supreme Court of
its power to select and appoint all State Bar Court hearing
judges and to eliminate the lay judge position in the Review
Department violates the separation of powers doctrine. In
support of petitioners, former State Bar Discipline Monitor
Robert C. Fellmeth filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that
the appointment and (more importantly) reappointment of
State Bar Court judges by elected officials would impermis-
sibly politicize what should be a purely judicial process and









cause judges seeking reappointment to conform their deci-
sions to the will of their appointing authorities.
Rejecting the arguments of petitioners and Professor
Fellmeth, the four-member majority held that the disputed
provision of SB 143, as codified at Business and Professions
Code section 6079.1(a), does not violate the separation of
powers provision of the state Con-
stitution. Although repeatedly af-
firming the Supreme Court's "ex- Writing for two dissent
pressly reserved, primary, inher- anoted that the frams
ent authority over [attorney] ad- deliberately refused to pe
mission and discipline," the ma-
jority noted that "the separation of
powers principle does not com-
mand 'a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Gov-
ernment from one another,"' and acknowledged that "in the
field of attorney-client conduct, we recognize that he judi-
ciary and the Legislature are in some sense partners in regu-
lation." Citing to several instances of the Supreme Court's
refusal to implement express legislative command in the area
of attorney discipline, the majority reiterated that "this court
retains ultimate control over all the admission and disciplin-
ary functions of the State Bar Court," but found that allowing
executive and legislative branch officials to appoint some of
the Hearing Department judges does not materially impair
that inherent and ultimate power because (1) the requirements
for legislative and executive branch appointment of Hearing
Department judges are almost identical to the requirements
specified in Supreme Court rules, and (2) the legislative and
executive branches are permitted to appoint only Hearing De-
partment judges, while the Supreme Court retains ultimate
authority to appoint the Review Department judges who in-
dependently review appeals from hearing judge decisions.
Further, the majority rejected one provision of SB 143
that purports to authorize the Board of Governors to screen
and rate all applicants for hearing
judge positions, and instead reaf- Justice Brown conclu
firmed its existing requirement examined here shows di
that all applicants for State Bar coordinatebranchofgove
Court judge positions be screened acceptance of such legi
and evaluated by its own Appli- beyond comity and coop
cant Evaluation and Nomination
Committee; thus, legislative and
executive branch appointing authorities are limited to appoint-
ing applicants found qualified by the Supreme Court's screen-
ing body. The majority stated: "In light of the requirement
that an applicant must be found qualified by the Applicant
Evaluation and Nomination Committee or by this court be-
fore he or she may be appointed as a State Bar Court hearing
judge, and the broad authority of the Review Department (all
of whose members we appoint) to evaluate and to accept or
reject independently the findings and recommendations of
hearing judges, to order additional evidentiary proceedings,
and to render the State Bar Court's ultimate findings and rec-






California Regulatory Law Reporter + Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) + covers November 1999-April 2001
not continue to repose confidence in and to rely upon a State
Bar Court in which some hearing judges are appointed by the
executive and legislative branches pursuant o section 6079.1."
In conjunction with its ruling, the majority amended sec-
tion 961 of the California Rules of Court, effective July 1,
2000, to provide for staggered terms of the hearing judges to
be appointed effective November
lJoyce 1, 2000; and abrogated one pro-
.Justice ofce Kennard vision of SB 143 by announcing
aration of powers doctrine that it would continue to use its
;of the U.S. Constitution
own appointed Applicant Evalu-
i ranhes.appi ation and Nomination Committee
to screen and evaluate all appli-
cants for the State Bar Court.
Writing for two dissenters, Justice Joyce Kennard traced
the origins of the separation of powers doctrine and noted
that the framers of the U.S. Constitution deliberately refused
to permit Congress to appoint any officers of the judicial or
executive branches. According to Justice Kennard, "[ilt is
worth noting that, consistent with the federal Constitution's
limitations on Congress's role in the appointment and removal
of executive and judicial branch officers, the California Con-
stitution gives the Legislature no role at all in the appoint-
ment of judges." Justice Kennard wrote that "interbranch
appointments ...raise serious separation of powers
concerns, ...must be carefully scrutinized and should be per-
mitted only if there exists either a special justification for the
interbranch appointing mechanism or particular safeguards
to protect the appointee from extrabranch influence after ap-
pointment. Because here the proponents of the challenged
law have shown neither a special justification nor particular
safeguards, the challenged law is invalid."
Leading off with the statement "[t]he wanton pursuit of
power is not a new problem," Justice Janice Rogers Brown
wrote her own dissent. Justice Brown quoted the U.S. Su-
preme Court for the proposition
d that "the legislation that "[a] Judiciary free from con-
spect for this court as a trol by the Executive and the Leg-
nent. The majority's abject islature is essential if there is a
tive impudence goes far right to have claims decided bytion. This is abdication." judges who are free from poten-
______Thsisabdcation." tial domination by other branches
of Government." Justice Brown
noted that Professor Fellmeth, in a 1988 progress report to
the legislature on the State Bar Discipline Monitor project,
characterized legislative and executive branch involvement
in the State Bar's attorney disciplinary function in California
as "perhaps...unprecedented," in light of the fact that "in 33
states, the state supreme court appoints not only the adjudi-
cators, but also the commission overseeing the entire disci-
plinary system operation, including investigations and trial
counsel....Perhaps, more importantly, this is a judicial posi-
tion and one unique to the very special jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court." Justice Brown concluded that "[t]he legis-







ordinate branch of government. T1
tance of such legislative impuden
and cooperation. This is abdicatio
And finally, on March 1, 200
Cal. 4th 1 (2001), the California Su
upheld a Review Department deci
mary disbarment of Cristeta Pagui
Professions Code section 6102(c)
summary disbarment of an attorney
involves moral turpitude or where
an element of the offense is the
specific intent to deceive, defraud,
steal, or make or suborn a false
statement. Paguirigan pled no
contest to one count of forgery
after forging the signature of a wit
conviction falls squarely with the
ute; and the Review Department re
barment. Paguirigan petitioned the
for review, arguing that-as interp
6102(c) usurps the plenary autho
preme Court over attorney discipli[
mit a respondent o present or the
of mitigating factors. [17:1 CRLR
Following its decision in Obrie
Court reaffirmed its "primary auth
attorneys" and found that "the lel
statute relating to attorney disciplir
infringe on this court's inherent ai
Court noted that the legislature h
disbarment in statutes dating bac
summary disbarment statute does
adopted rules, and stated that "[t
spected the Legislature's reasonab
tice of law by providing, among c
disbarment under certain circumsta
1922, the Supreme Court also rejec
that the summary disbarment stat
fair" because it does not give the
be heard; the court held that Paguir
process in the criminal proceeding
be deemed to have known that one
that particular crime would be disb
In a similar case, In re Lesans
the California Supreme Court reje
to Business and Professions Code s
disbarment statute. Attorney Stuart
test to one count of an attempted 1
receiving briefs from both sides bu
gument, the Review Department d
conviction necessarily involves mo
within the summary disbarment sta
for review, arguing that the summar
apply only if the underlying offens
to practice law and that his convic
he majority's abject accep-
ce goes far beyond comity
n."
1 in In re Paguirigan, 25
preme Court unanimously
sion recommending sum-
irigan under Business and
That statute requires the
convicted of a felony that
private act unrelated to the practice of law." In rejecting this
argument, Justice Kennard wrote for a unanimous court:
"Petitioner's attempt to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a
child who was 14 or 15 years old and at least 10 years younger
than himself was such a serious breach of the duties of re-
spect and care that all adults owe to all children, and it showed
such a flagrant disrespect for the law and for societal norms,
that continuation of petitioner's State Bar membership would
be likely to undermine public confidence in and respect for
the legal profession. Therefore,
we agree with the State Bar Court
After a flurry of litigation activity during 1999-2001, the that petitioner was convicted f 
a
decade-long Brosterhous saga is finally reaching an feloyiong mal tupitde,
end. felony involving moral turpitude,
and we accept the State Bar
Court's recommendation that he
:ness in a civil action. Her be summarily disbarred under Business and Professions Code
summary disbarment stat- section 6102, subdivision (c)."
commended summary dis- After a flurry of litigation activity during 1999-2001,
California Supreme Court the decade-long Brosterhous aga is finally reaching an end.
'reted by the Bar-section In August 1999 in Brosterhous v. State Bar of California,
rity of the California Su- No. 95AS03901, Sacramento County Superior Court Judge
ne because it does not per- Morrison C. England Jr. ruled that the Bar illegally spent its
court to consider evidence members' mandatory licensing fees on improper political and
2141 ideological activities in 1989. Brosterhous arose from the U.S.
n (see above),the Supreme Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Keller v. State Bar,
ority over the discipline of 496 U.S. 1 (1990), in which the Court struck down as viola-
gislature's enactment of a tive of the first amendment he Bar's use of mandatory mem-
ne does not in and of itself bership fees for ideological or political purposes unrelated to
uthority in this area." The the "regulation of the legal profession or improving the qual-
as provided for summary ity of legal services." In response to Keller, the Bar adopted
k to 1872, found that the procedures under which it analyzes and categorizes its ex-
iot conflict with judicially penses as "chargeable" or "nonchargeable," and offers all Bar
iraditionally, we have re- members an opportunity to decline to pay for the noncharge-
le regulation of the prac- able portion (the so-called "Hudson deduction"). In 1992, the
)ther things, for summary Brosterhous plaintiffs challenged the Bar's 1991 calculation
nces."Citingcaselaw from of its chargeable vs. nonchargeable expenses during 1989;
ted Paguirigan's argument whereas the Bar calculated its nonchargeable expenses at $3
ute is "fundamentally un- per lawyer, plaintiffs alleged that he Bar's calculations failed
attorney an opportunity to to include numerous nonchargeable activities and argued that
igan was afforded full due their Hudson deduction for that year should have been $87
and found that she must per lawyer. In his "phase one" ruling on liability only, Judge
result of her conviction of England ruled that numerous Bar activities classified as
barment. "chargeable" to all Bar members should have been classified
ky, 25 Cal. 4th 11 (2001), as "nonchargeable," and announced his intent to proceed to
cted a different challenge "phase two" regarding damages. [17:1 CRLR 211-12]
ection 6102, the summary On December 24, 1999, the Bar filed an unusual mid-
K. Lesansky pled no con- trial petition for writ of mandate in the Third District Court
lewd act on a child. After of Appeal, asking the appellate court to reverse Judge
it without holding oral ar- England's phase one decision. On January 14, 2000, the
etermined that Lesansky's Third District denied the State Bar's petition, No. C034486,
ral turpitude and thus falls saying that the Bar would have an adequate remedy at law
itute. Lesansky petitioned by appeal from the final judgment. The case then returned
disbarment statute should to Judge England, who-pursuant to the parties' stipula-
e demonstrates unfitness tion-ruled in July 2000 that the 43 State Bar members who
tion concerned "a wholly challenged the Bar's calculations are due an additional $10
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each, plus interest. Significantly, Judge England also ruled
that plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorneys' fees. Al-
though the Bar initially appealed this ruling, the Board of
Governors voted to withdraw its notice of appeal during a
closed session at its January 6, 2001 meeting. According to
State Bar President Palmer Brown Madden, "The ultimate
verdict in this case was of such a limited scope that the Board
has decided an appeal is unnecessary. This case was about
the way the Bar was ten years ago. We're a different Bar
today."
On March 4, 2001, plaintiffs filed their motion for attor-
neys' fees, seeking a total award of $2.36 million based on
the complexity and importance of the case and what they claim
was the Bar's bad faith and delay in defending it. At this writ-
ing, Judge England is scheduled to hold a hearing on plain-
tiffs' motion on May 11, 200 1.
On February 11, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to review the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Septem-
ber 1999 dismissal of Morrow, et al. v. State Bar of Califor-
nia, 188 F.3d 1174, another challenge to the Bar's political
activities. In Morrow, the Ninth Circuit held that it is consti-
tutional to compel attorneys to pay dues to a unified bar that
engages in political activities so long as dissenting members
are not compelled to fund those activities with mandatory
dues and mandatory bar membership does not impede dis-
senting members from expressing their own views and/or dis-
agreeing with the view of the bar. [17:1 CRLR 212]
Conservative legal group's continue their attacks on In-
terest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs, which
have been created in almost every state (including Califor-
nia) to fund legal services for the indigent. Under California's
IOLTA law (Business and Professions Code section 6210 et
seq.), lawyers are required to deposit client retainers into spe-
cial interest-bearing checking accounts; banks then transfer
interest earned on these accounts to the State Bar's Legal
Services Trust Fund, which in turn awards it to qualified le-
gal services organizations to pro-
vide legal services to indigent
people. In Phillips v. Washington In Legal Services Corp. v L
Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 Court invalidated federal res
(1998), the U.S. Supreme Court attorneys who are funded t
analyzed the Washington Legal Corporation are allowed to
Foundation's (WLF) challenge to in pursuing welfare claims.
a similar IOLTA program created
by the Texas State Bar, and concluded that the interest earned
on client funds held in IOLTA accounts is the "private prop-
erty" of the client for purposes of the takings clause of the
fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court remanded
the case to the district court for consideration whether the
IOLTA funds had been "taken" by the state, as well as the
amount of "just compensation," if any, which is due to the
challengers. [16:1 CRLR 198] Following a two-day bench
trial in September 1999, U.S. District Court Judge James R.
Nowlin held in Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation, 86 F. Supp. 2d 624 (Jan. 28,
2000), that the Texas IOLTA program does not qualify as "con-
fiscatory regulation" of client property because there is nei-
ther a compensable loss nor a taking. According to Judge
Nowlin, absent the IOLTA program and its creation of a
"unique class of revenue," there would be no interest to con-
fiscate, such that the client whose funds are being held in the
checking account cannot show an identifiable compensable
loss. At this writing, WLF's appeal of Judge Nowlin's deci-
sion is pending before the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
In the meantime, WLF challenged the state of
Washington's similar IOLTA program which was created by
the Washington Supreme Court in 1984; under that state's
law, the interest is transferred to the Legal Foundation of
Washington, a charitable organization established by the
Washington Supreme Court. Again alleging that IOLTA works
an unconstitutional taking of client funds, WLF lost in the
district court and appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 deci-
sion in Phillips v. WLF (see above), the Ninth Circuit held in
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 236 F.3d 1097 (Jan. 10, 2001), that the interest
generated by IOLTA accounts is the property of the clients
and customers whose money is deposited into the accounts,
such that the fifth amendment's takings clause applies. The
Ninth Circuit concluded: "IOLTA programs spread rapidly
because they were an exceedingly intelligent idea. Money
that lawyers deposited in bank trust accounts always produced
earnings, but before IOLTA, the clients who owned the money
did not receive any of the earnings that their money produced.
IOLTA extracted the earnings from the banks and gave it to
charities, largely to fund legal services for the poor. That is a
very worthy purpose. But as Phillips reminds us, the interest
belongs to the clients. It does not belong to the banks, or the
lawyers, or the escrow companies, or the state of Washing-
ton. If the clients' money is to be taken by the State of Wash-
ington for the worthy public pur-
pose of funding legal services for
lazquez, the U.S. Supreme indigents or anything else, then
rictions on arguments that the state of Washington has to pay
rough the Legal Services just compensation for the taking.
make on behalf of clients That serves the purpose of impos-
ing the costs on society as a whole
for worthwhile social programs,
rather than on the individuals who have the misfortune to be
standing where the cost first falls." The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case for determination of the amount of compen-
sation required (if any). At this writing, the Legal Foundation
of Washington's petition for rehearing en banc is pending be-
fore the Ninth Circuit.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (Feb.
28, 2001), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal restric-
tions on arguments that attorneys who are funded through the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) are allowed to make on be-
half of clients in pursuing welfare claims. Since 1996, Con-
California Regulatory Law Reporter * Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) * covers November 1999-April 2001
IJ
LEGAL/ACCOUNTING REGULATORY AGENCIES
gress has prohibited LSC from funding any organization that
represents clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing
welfare laws. These funding restrictions apply even if the con-
stitutional or statutory challenges become apparent only after
the legal representation is under way. In a 5-4 decision, the
majority found that this funding restriction constitutes imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination that interferes with the proper
functioning of attorneys and the court system. In its decision,
the majority distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991),
which upheld a federal policy prohibiting family planning agen-
cies which receive federal funds from providing abortion coun-
seling. According to the majority, Rust involved government
speech because the physicians in Rust spoke on behalf of the
government. Here, the attorneys are clearly not speaking for
the government but on behalf of their client-often against the
government, and the funding restrictions prevent legal services
attorneys from carrying out the traditional role and responsi-
bilities of attorneys to "present all the reasonable and well-
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case"
and therefore distort the functioning of the judicial system. The
majority held that the statute is "an attempt to draw lines around
the LSC program to exclude from litigation those arguments
and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their
nature are within the province of the courts to consider."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia found the case to
be indistinguishable from Rust, stating: "Today's decision is
quite simply inexplicable on the basis of our prior law. The
only difference between Rust and the present case is that the
former involved 'distortion' of (that is to say, refusal to sub-
sidize) the normal work of doctors, and the latter involves
'distortion' of (that is to say, refusal to subsidize) the normal
work of lawyers. The Court's decision displays not only an
improper special solicitude for our own profession; it also
displays, I think, the very fondness for 'reform through the
courts'- the making of innumerable social judgments through
judge-pronounced constitutional imperatives- that prompted
Congress to restrict publicly funded litigation of this sort."
On March 20, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review the California Supreme Court's decision in Warden v.
State Bar of California, 21 Cal. 4th 628 (1999), in which the
California court upheld the constitutionality of the State Bar's
Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program. In
Warden, plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the State Bar's
MCLE program violates his right to equal protection by ex-
empting certain Bar members from its requirements; subse-
quent to the California court's decision, the legislature en-
acted and the Governor signed SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg)
(Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999), which repeals one of those
exemptions from the MCLE requirement and makes legisla-
tive findings supporting the remaining exemptions. [17:1
CRLR 209, 212-13]
On January 26,2000 in Greenberg v. State Bar, 78 Cal.
App. 4th 39 (2000), rehearing denied Feb. 10, 2000, review
denied Apr. 26, 2000, the First District Court of Appeal held
that the Bar's requirement of MCLE courses relating to sub-
stance abuse, emotional distress, and elimination of bias does
not violate the first amendment. In Greenberg, California at-
torneys required to comply with the State Bar's MCLE re-
quirements challenged the constitutionality of the MCLE pro-
gram based on equal protection grounds, as in Warden, and
on first amendment grounds. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the State Bar.
The First District affirmed the trial court's ruling as to
the equal protection claim, saying that it is bound by the re-
cent majority opinion of the California Supreme Court in
Warden to affirm the judgment in favor of the State Bar with
respect to this issue. The First District then considered plain-
tiffs' first amendment claim. The attorneys argued that the
MCLE program violates their first amendment right "to be
free of compulsory governmental propaganda in favor of an
ideological purpose with which appellants do not agree, and
which is not 'germane' or rationally related to the legitimate
goals of legal education for practitioners." The court first noted
that Warden had apparently decided that the MCLE program
requirements are rationally related to the "consumer protec-
tion" goals of the legislation and needs of the legal profes-
sion. In response to appellants' specific objections to MCLE
requirements mandating a certain number of classes relating
to the prevention of substance abuse and emotional distress
and the elimination of bias, the First District concluded that,
in light of Warden, these subjects are rationally related to the
consumer protection goals of the MCLE program.
In Mack v. State Bar of California, attorney Michael Mack
of Corona del Mar is challenging the Bar's public disclosure
of discipline to which he stipulated. In 1994, the Bar filed for-
mal disciplinary charges against Mack; under Business and
Professions Code section 6086.1 (a), that filing converts a pre-
viously confidential State Bar investigation into a matter of
public record. In 1995, Mack stipulated to the issuance of a
"private reproval" as the discipline for his misconduct. The
stipulation provided: "The parties understand that although this
reproval is termed 'private,' it arises in a public proceeding.
Although the State Bar of California will not affirmatively pro-
vide any publicity to the disposition, the file, including the stipu-
lation, [and] any order approving it, in this case will remain
public and will be available on any specific inquiry by a mem-
ber of the public." In 1999, Mack discovered that the Bar was
disclosing the fact that Mack has a "public record of disci-
pline" on its Internet Web site. The Web site did not disclose
the nature of the discipline, but rather invited interested parties
to contact the Bar, in writing or by telephone, and pay a charge
in order to obtain more information concerning Mack's disci-
plinary record. In December 1999, Mack brought suit against
the Bar, alleging that it had violated the terms of his stipulation
by posting notice of his disciplinary record on its Web site.
The Bar opposed Mack's suit, contending that it did not "affir-
matively provide any publicity to the disposition," and that its
Web site is merely a far more efficient means of providing
public access to its public records of attorney discipline. In a
May 2000 decision, No. BC221528, Los Angeles County Su-
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perior Court Judge Madeleine Flier agreed with the Bar and
dismissed Mack's case, emphasizing that the information
available via the Internet is public information and is no dif-
ferent from the information that would be available through
a phone call or office visit to the State Bar (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). At this writing, Mack's appeal of Judge Flier's
decision is pending in the Second District Court of Appeal.
On August 14, 2000 in In re Eben Gossage, 23 Cal. 4th
1080 (2000), the California Supreme Court rejected a State
Bar Court recommendation that Eben Gossage be admitted
to the practice of law. At the age of 20, Gossage was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter for the 1975 killing of his
sister. Gossage also suffered numerous other criminal con-
victions, including multiple felony convictions for forgery, a
crime of moral turpitude. After graduating from law school
in 1991 and passing the Bar exam in 1993, Gossage applied
for a moral character determination with the Committee of
Bar Examiners in 1994. Finding that he had since been reha-
bilitated, the State Bar Court recommended that he be admit-
ted to the State Bar. The Supreme Court rejected that recom-
mendation, finding that Gossage failed to sustain his burden
of proving rehabilitation. The court noted Gossage's appar-
ent recovery from substance abuse, his academic achieve-
ments, and his community involvement since his last discharge
from parole in 1984. However, the court also found that
Gossage continued a pattern of misdemeanor convictions in-
volving, for the most part, willful failures to appear in court
for traffic violations and to obey court orders from the time
he was paroled until he applied for admission to the Bar.
Moreover, the court noted that Gossage was untruthful on his
moral character application and failed to disclose the full ex-
tent of his criminal history. "In order to safeguard the public
and protect the integrity of the profession," the Supreme Court
concluded, "we cannot conclude Gossage has established his
present good moral character. We therefore reject the State
Bar Court's recommendation and decline to admit Gossage
to the practice of law."
Unlike numerous other states, the California Bar does
not offer reciprocity licensure to attorneys licensed in other
states. An out-of-state attorney who is licensed in another state
and who wishes to temporarily practice law in California must
apply for pro hac vice admission under California Rule of
Court 983, associate with a California State Bar member, and
pay a $50 fee to the State Bar. However, this limited admis-
sion is not available to attorneys who live in California or do
substantial business in the state-those attorneys must take
and pass the Attorney's Bar examination (a somewhat short-
ened version of the California Bar exam). In Paciulan v.
George, 229 F.3d 1226 (Oct. 17, 2000), cert. denied Jan. 8,
2001, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a chal-
lenge that this rule unconstitutionally discriminates against
Californians. The court first noted that appellants were rep-
resented by Joseph Giannini, who has challenged admissions
requirements to the State Bar in at least six other cases since
1987 on a variety of grounds. [10:4 CRER 187-88; 8:3 CRLR
131] Here, the Court ruled that residents of this state who are
licensed elsewhere are not deprived of their privileges and
immunities under Article IV, or their first amendment rights
to speak for or associate with their clients or to petition the
government. According to the court, if these arguments were
accepted, "[a] California resident wishing to practice in Cali-
fornia but wanting to avoid the difficult California bar ex-
amination could become a member of the bar of the state with
the least restrictive admissions requirement, then demand
admission to the California bar as a matter of right. The Con-
stitution does not compel such a result. States have tradition-
ally enjoyed the exclusive power to license and regulate mem-
bers of their respective bars."
The Ninth Circuit also noted that "[w]hile the California
Legislature may choose to alter the requirements for pro hac
vice admission to practice in California courts, it is not within
the province of the federal courts to do so." The California
legislature has taken a first step toward reciprocity licensure
with its 2000 passage of SB 1782 (Morrow), which asks the
California Supreme Court to convene a task force to study
the issue and adopt rules allowing California admission of
other-state attorneys without passing the California Bar exam
(see 2000 LEGISLATION).
RECENT MEETINGS
On March 31,2000, the Committee on Communications
and Member Relations discussed the impact of fee scaling
now allowed for State Bar members who earn less than
$40,000 per year and/or less than $25,000 per year from the
practice of law (see MAJOR PROJECTS). According to staff,
11,000 attorneys qualified for scaling, and 9,000 of those
members were eligible for scaling as earning less than $25,000
in 1999. The numbers are expected to increase as several mem-
bers complained that they did not realize that there is an op-
tion to scale and are requesting to do so after having already
paid their 2000 dues.
In November 2000, the Board approved Rule XVII of its
Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California,
regarding testing accommodations for applicants with dis-
abilities. The proposed rule was circulated for public com-
ment in December 1999; no comments were received. The
new rule sets forth general policies and defines "disability,"
"physical impairment," "mental impairment," "qualified ap-
plicant with a disability," and "reasonable accommodation"
for purposes of applying for the First Year Law Students'
Examination or the California Bar Examination. The rule sets
forth procedures for submitting a petition for testing accom-
modations and provides for review of staff's decision if a
request for accommodation is modified or denied.
At its April 2001 meeting, the Board of Governors re-
jected a Conference of Delegates recommendation calling for
legislation to establish a five-year statute of limitations on
the commencement of attorney discipline matters, except
when the discipline is based upon a criminal conviction in-
volving the practice of law or when the respondent waives
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the statute of limitations. The recommendation was opposed
by both the Committee on Regulation and Discipline and the
Committee on Legislation and Court Relations. OCTC also
opposed the legislation, saying that it does not properly bal-
ance public policy favoring the resolution of disputes and the
extinction of stale claims and because existing Rule 51 of the
Rules of Procedure provides a rule of limitations and appro-
priate tolling provisions.
FUTURE MEETINGS
2001: June 8-9 in San Francisco; July 27-28 in Los An-
geles; September 6-9 (annual meeting) in Anaheim; October
19 (new member orientation) in Santa Barbara; December 7-
8 in Los Angeles.
2002: January 25-26 in Los Angeles; March 15-17 in
Sonoma; May 3-4 in Los Angeles; June 21-22 in San Fran-
cisco; August 23-24 in Los Angeles; October 10 (new mem-
ber orientation) in Monterey; October 10-13 (annual meet-
ing) in Monterey; December 6-7 in San Francisco.
2003: January 24-26 in Oxnard; March 21-22 in Long
Beach; May 16-17 in San Francisco; July 25-26 in Los An-
geles; September 3-4 (new member orientation) in Anaheim;
September 5-8 (annual meeting) in Anaheim; October 17-
18 in Los Angeles; December 5-6 in San Francisco.
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